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Electricity merger control in the light of the EU “Third energy package”
By Jorge Velasco Fernández∗
1. Introduction
After more than two years of legislative proceedings within the European Union
Institutions, the so-called “third energy package” –a set of legislations conceived to lead
the EU electricity and gas markets to a complete integration and liberalization - was
published on August 2009.
The legislation, which is composed of two directives and three regulations1 principally dealing with conditions for access to gas and electric transmission networks,
cooperation between energy regulators and the introduction of the appropriate rules for
the completion of the internal market for electricity and gas2- aims at reaching global
EU energy objectives such as the access to broader consumer choice, fairer electricity
and gas prices, cleaner sources of energy and security of supply.3
Nonetheless, the set of legislations was not passed without long discussions on
some of its cornerstones. Particularly, when it comes to the separation of the generation

∗
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1
As it occurs in other fields of competence of the EU, the European Institutions have resorted -within the
framework of the liberalization of the energy markets- to a mix of different legal instruments to
crystallize their objectives. The European directives –that are binding for the Member States when it
comes to the objectives to be achieved but, unlike the European regulations, leave the countries the choice
of the form and method to do so- have frequently prevailed, allowing each Member State to select the
legal tools best suited to reach the opening of the markets according to the particular features of each
national energy landscape.
2
That is to say, the completion of one single efficient European market instead of 27 different national
markets.
3
Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing directive 2003/54/EC.
3
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and supply activities from the network operations in the electricity markets –a key
factor of the liberalization process-, the European Commission supported from the very
beginning, and throughout the legislative procedure, the ownership unbundling option.4
Notwithstanding this, and principally due to the strong pressure inflicted by some
Member States5, a watered down version of the separation of functions was finally
approved by the European Parliament and European Council. Accordingly, countries in
the EU were given the option to choose less intrusive alternative in terms of property
disaggregation.6
Against this backdrop, the EU merger control applied by the Directorate General
for Competition of the European Commission (DG Competition), which has been
playing a role in the liberalization process of the electricity markets as a kind of “exante” supervisor, faces new challenges. In the light of the goals set by the new EU
energy legislation and the tools that, on the regulatory front, have been provided to the
European Commission, one might wonder whether the EU merger control enforcement
4

The outright ownership separation of the transmission activities –a stage of the electric power industry
commonly viewed as a natural monopoly- from the generation and supply stages –considered as areas
where competition rules might efficiently apply- is the strictest solution to address discriminatory access
conditions applied by the companies that have traditionally provided electric services. It should be noted
that other softer alternatives that deal with the separation of functions -required to make competition
thrive in the generation and supply segments- have been applied in different jurisdictions.
Numerous authors have written abundantly about the essence and main characteristics of natural
monopolies as well as the evolution of some of the stages that constitute the electric power industry
towards a more competitive environment. References to this concept are found in a broad array of
publications (from the “Principles of Political Economy”, where John Stuart Mill introduced the term of
Natural Monopoly for the first time, to more recent publications specifically related to the electricity field.
See PETER Z. GROSSMAN AND DANIEL H. COLE, THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY:
DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (Taylor & Francis
Ltd., 2003)).
With regard to the European Commission support to the ownership separation, see, amongst others,
speech of Philip Lowe, former Director General of DG Competition, Can EU competition policy create
competition in the energy sector? 8-9 (Nov. 6, 2008) (transcript available at the European Commission
website http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2008_09_en.pdf).
5
Some EU countries were concerned about the possibility that the unbundling measures weakened the
European Union suppliers (reducing the economies of scale and increasing the cost of capital of the
supply business by forcing these companies to unbundle); as a result, according to those Member States,
the security of supply could be put in jeopardy. Uneasiness about potential market entries of “foreign”
operators like Gazprom in the EU energy markets were probably behind those arguments though.
6
When it comes to the different options for the unbundling of activities in the electricity field, see
directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54.
4
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will have to be reviewed when analyzing merger operations in the electricity markets.
The high degree of complexity of enforcing merger control in any jurisdiction is
not novel, particularly when different authorities are responsible for gauging the
competitive and anticompetitive effects arising from merger operations. As it will be
noted in this paper, that endeavor results even thornier in the electricity sector, where
the relevant competition authorities have to simultaneously deal with the strengths and
weaknesses of regulatory and antitrust approaches.
In this context, the role that the EU merger regulation should play in the
liberalization process arena is indeed controversial. Conflicting opinions about that role
have arisen as a result of the decisions undertaken by the DG Competition in this field
within the last years. Thus, in some cases the Directorate General for Competition has
been criticized for its application of a too-relaxed standard when analyzing mergers in
the electricity markets.7 On the opposite end, incumbents –but also some Member
States- frequently argue that a too strict application of the merger control could hinder
the EU’s objective related to the security of supply, since only large utilities can afford
the investments required in order to maintain and develop an appropriate level of
networks and cross-border interconnections.8

7

In this respect, some voices have called for a stricter application of the merger control in the electric
power industry. See for instance Arndt Christiansen, Regulation and EU Merger Control in the
Liberalized Sector, 2006, available at http://ssrn.com/author=369249.
Indeed, according to some authors, relaxed standards applied to merger operations might lead to a
“replication of effects of past regulation” and result in anticompetitive effects (PETER C.
CARSTENSEN, SUSAN BETH FARMER, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER ANALYSIS IN
DEREGULATED AND NEWLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES” (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
ed., 2008).
8
The application of very strict standards could, according to some market participants, hinder the
establishment of strong European actors which are required to “match the power of external suppliers”
(Herbert Ungerer -European Commission-, Some Comments on the Relationship of Competition Policy
and European Energy Security, European Review of Energy Markets- volume 2, issue 2 (December
2007)). In this context, and even if it was in the purpose of counteracting theories claiming for a more
relaxed enforcement of EU merger control rules, Herbert Ungerer –former Deputy Director General in
DG Competition- referred to this debate in several occasions, and particularly when he stated “[i]s this
the right time to address the deficiencies in competition? Or are we scrubbing the deck, while the ship is
sinking?” (Speech of Herbert Ungerer -European Commission-, Which Approach to Competition in
Electricity and Gas – are we Tackling the Right Issues?, Lublijana (22 May 2008)).
5
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This paper, assuming the necessary interplay between competition law and
regulation in the electricity liberalized markets9, will discuss the extent to which EU
merger control should undertake a new (or just traditional but nuanced) approach to
mergers in order to facilitate the achievement of the goals of the new energy regulation
and, if necessary, whether and to what extent merger control could offset possible gaps
of the sector-specific legislation10, including a potential consideration of noncompetition dimensions by DG Competition.11
In order to address these questions, section 2 will initiate the study with an
analysis of the current state of play of the EU energy legislation. Some relevant features
of the electricity markets which characterize this industry as well as a general approach
to mergers undertaken by US and EU competition authorities will also be the object of
this section.
In sections 3 and 4, the paper will proceed with a comparative analysis of the
merger control applied in the electricity sector in the EU and the US (particularly by
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Department of Justice at the federal
level), leading jurisdictions in the enforcement of competition law. That being said, the
comparative study will not be the final goal of the paper but an instrumentality to
analyze possible drawbacks of the EU merger control in the light of the new electricity
regulation. Moreover, rather than carrying out a comparison between the two systems
seeking to determine which of the two is stricter in terms of, for instance, blocked
transactions, this paper prioritizes on defining an approach which is more focused on
the actual competitive concerns that might arise from a merger within the electric
9

The importance of the interrelation between competition law and regulation in the electricity market
within the framework of a liberalized scenario will be assumed as it has been sufficiently supported by
numerous commentators. On the political front, see Neelie Kroes, former European Commissioner for
Competition Policy, The interface between Regulation and Competition Law, Hamburg (28 April 2009).
10
Philip Lowe, supra note 4, p. 8 - 9.
11
Amongst others, considerations related to the security of supply and the completion of the single
European electricity market.
6
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industry.12
In section 5, the paper will explore whether the current approach of EU merger
control is likely not only to take into consideration but also to promote the achievement
of the goals of the third energy package, assessing the appropriateness of including noncompetition factors within the merger control analysis applied by DG Competition.
Finally, the paper will conclude that electricity might not need a particular test
when it comes to the analysis of mergers taking place in this sector. Rather, the test
applied -as well as the whole merger control procedure- should be sufficiently flexible
in order to take into account the idiosyncrasies of the electricity markets, not limiting
the analysis to a mere review of market share and market concentration levels. The
inclusion of non-competition related aspects such as the integration of EU markets, the
liberalization process itself or security of supply concerns might be also considered by
DG Competition.

12

In fact, some alleged “stricter” systems have proven themselves to be blocking mergers that, in fact, do
not represent any harm for competition (so-called false positive) and vice versa.
7
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2. EU Regulatory framework and evolution of the electric power industry
Whereas in the majority of the industries the legislation, if any, adapt itself to the
structural configuration of a given sector, in the world of regulated industries (and
particularly in the gas and electric businesses) the applicable rules -whether enacted by
the legislature, ordered by an administrative agency or influenced by a judicial decisionhave at least conditioned (and frequently contributed to shape) the structure of the
industry13. The process of deregulation and all its intended and unintended
consequences (as well as potential regulatory loopholes) that for the last 20 years or
more have being taken place in some areas of the US and the European Union14 have
intensified this trend, setting the pace of the electricity sector15. However,
countervailing tendencies, and particularly a wave of mergers that have occurred in the
US and European markets, might have the potential to thwart some of the goals set by
the regulation. The merger control enforcer in each jurisdiction should accordingly
gauge and differentiate between legitimate transactions that contribute to increase the
efficiencies of an organization and eventually bring benefits to the consumers, and the
operations that could adversely affect those customers.
In order to grasp the complexities and challenges of enforcing merger control
rules in the electricity sector it is necessary to approach the legislative configuration and
idiosyncrasies of this sector. To that end, this section begins reviewing the European
Union’s legal moves to open up the competitive segments of the electric power
13

For instance, in the context of the natural gas industry, the Hope Natural Gas case (320 U.S. 603
(1944)) and its decision about the rate base and rate of return of transmission and supply activities,
conditioned the disaggregation of the transmission assets of the utilities. The Public Utility Holding Act
of 1935 also limited for years the expansion of utilities’ activities to multiple states in the US as well as
subjected to approval the right of these companies to engage in non-utility business.
14
Remarkable processes of liberalization of the electricity sector have also taken place, amongst others, in
the UK –prior to the EU liberalization boost-, Chile, Argentina, New Zealand and some areas of
Australia.
15
While the vertical integration of the electric industry was considered a natural trend of the business,
driving companies to aggregate generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities, factors such
as governmental incentives, unbundling orders, supply obligations or rates of return set by the regulators
have promoted competitive markets at the generation and supply levels, where newcomers reshape the
structure of the industry.
8
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industry, which eventually have led to the approval of the third energy package. This
overview is followed by an approximation to the industry structure and main features
that condition this business and its subsequent merger analysis.
a. Overview of the EU electricity legislation: a long way towards
deregulation and single-market integration
The European Union -and particularly the European Commission- has
traditionally believed in the completion of a single European integrated market as a key
driver for increasing overall prosperity in the EU.16 The Single European Act, adopted
in 1986, advanced one more step in the development of this integrated market goal by
introducing the notion of the Internal Market, which was defined as “an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured”.17
On the energy front, and particularly in the fields of electricity and gas, the
completion of the Internal Market was considered by the European Commission as an
essential step to ensure the establishment of competitive markets that would result in
more choices for the consumers in terms of electricity supplier, better quality of the
services and lower prices, at the same time as security of supply would be guaranteed.
In order to translate those objectives into practical measures, in the 1990s the EU
launched a process to open electricity markets to competition by liberalizing them moving away in some cases from vertically integrated state-owned electricity
companies-, with the additional prospect of reaching a single European electricity
market.18

16

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, art. 2.
Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), art. 13.
18
It is noteworthy that the goal of liberalizing the electric power industry –similar to the deregulation
process pursued by other jurisdictions out of the EU- was added to the objective of creating a single
European market. Some resemblances could be made between the latter objective and the principles
underlying the interstate commerce clause at the US level. Nevertheless, when it comes to the electric
17

9
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The first liberalization directives on electricity were adopted in 199619, with the
purpose of opening up the electricity markets by gradually introducing competition at
the generation and supply levels (“first energy package”). The Directive 96/92/EC,
while laying down that the achievement of a competitive electricity market was an
important step towards completion of the Internal Market, acknowledged that such
Internal Market in electricity should be implemented gradually, “in order to enable the
industry to adjust in a flexible and ordered manner to its new environment and to take
account of the different ways in which electricity systems are organized at present”.20
Accordingly, this piece of legislation set general conditions relating to, for instance, the
organization and functioning of the electricity sector, access to the transmission and
distribution network and the operation of systems.
Regrettably, the own shortcomings of an early legal framework for the electric
industry deregulation as well as the reluctance of a number of stakeholders and Member
States not completely adherent to the liberalization trend (in some cases failing to
properly implement the directives in their own national legislation) thwarted the
achievement of the integration and liberalization goals. However, the EU determination
of pursuing the development of the liberalization process brought about the enactment
of a second set of directives in 200321 (“second energy package”), in which there were
included, amongst others, unbundling provisions whereby electricity transmission
networks had to be run independently from the production and supply side.22 Other
power industry, the EU ambitions appear to be broader than the federal electric outreach insomuch as the
jurisdiction of the European Commission is not only confined to the EU equivalent of interstate
transmission and wholesale activities.
19
See particularly, Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December
1996, concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity.
20
Id. at section 5.
21
See specially Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC.
22
As it has been noted in previous sections -and will be further developed within this paper- the
disaggregation of the transmission and distribution activities in the electricity markets from the generation
and supply activities has progressively become one of the landmarks of the electricity liberalization
10
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energy related issues were also dealt with, particularly the security of supply and
reduction of the environmental impact of energy use. According to these second set of
directives, markets for all non-household electricity customers would be liberalized no
later than July 2004, whereas residential customers should wait until July 2007 in order
to be able to choose their electricity supplier in a competitive market.
b. Emergence of the EU “Third Energy Package”
The foregoing legislation was conceived to drive the EU electric power industry
to a truly liberalized scenario. However, the mechanisms provided by the second energy
package to accomplish that enterprise fell short, and competition in the European
electricity markets did not flourish as expected. Indeed, as a result of the findings
derived from the sector inquiry conducted by the European Commission in 2005 and
2006 in the EU electricity and gas markets23, doubts were casted about the second
energy package’s capacity to contribute to the completion of the internal energy

process.
As a matter of comparison, on the US front the attempts of the Federal authorities to reach this separation
have been conditioned by their lack of authority over intrastate matters and the reluctance of Congress to
foster this process. Thus, functional unbundling was required by Order 888 issued by FERC in 1996 –a
landmark of the US deregulation- as a means of assuring non-discriminatory open access to transmission.
Conversely, the operational unbundling alternative (consisting of the fact that “utilities would continue to
own transmission lines, but an independent system operator would have operational control”) received
the “moral” support of different federal authorities (particularly the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, but also de Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission) but was not
mandatory. Those systems operators (that have been voluntarily created in some regions of the US under
the form of Independent System Operator (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs)) aim at
guaranteeing open and equal access to all electricity market players as well as strengthening reliability of
the transmission stage in a certain area –taking care of proper investment in grid improvements,
congestion management, etc.
Roughly speaking, the absence of a specific Congress boost to liberalize the markets as well as the
jurisdictional peculiarities inherent to a Federal system have prevented the US from following an
homogenous pattern on the restructuring of the electric industry. Thus, the final configuration of the
wholesale and retail markets have not been uniformly set in the US. Instead, the different states have been
responsible for setting the pace and outreach of the deregulation. For further information on electricity
deregulation processes, see JAMES M. GRIFFIN AND STEVEN L. PULLER, ELECTRICITY
DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES (Volume IV in the Bush School series in the
Economics of Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, 2005).
23
The European Commission launched in 2005 a sector inquiry in order to identify, and subsequently
address, those factors that prevented the gas and electricity markets from achieving high levels of
competition. Preliminary results of the inquiry were issued in 2006 and the definite findings were
published in 2007.
11
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market.24 Indeed, in addition to the problems that arose from the incomplete
implementation of the 2003 directives25, the European Commission detected that the
legal framework, and particularly the directive 2003/54 related to electricity, did not
address some of the structural problems of the industry that had to be handled as a
precondition for the completion of the Internal Market.
Issues such as the high level of market concentration of the electricity and gas
markets, vertical integration (of supply, transmission and generation activities), absence
of adequate cross border interconnection (which inevitably leaded to an insufficient
integration between Member States’ markets), or lack of transparent information on the
market functioning, raised concerns in the European Commission.26 More concretely,
the European Commission identified a series of deficiencies of the legal framework that,
amongst other factors, led to that unintended situation. In general terms, they referred to
the lack of performing regulation on cross border interconnection, scarce powers
granted to national energy regulators and insufficient unbundling requirements in order
to guarantee non discriminatory access to the networks.27
Against this backdrop, in 2007 the European Commission launched a third
legislative energy package proposal with the purpose of addressing factors that, until
that time, had hampered the opening up of the electricity and gas markets in Europe.
The legislation consisted of two directives and three regulations.28 The objectives of the
24

Since the Hampton Court meeting of Heads of State and government in 2005, and the subsequent green
paper on an European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy approved in March 2006
(COM (2006)105 final), the energy internal market has increasingly become political priority for the
European Institutions.
25
Infringement procedures were opened at that time against more than half a dozen Member States for
failing to transpose –or insufficiently implement- the directives 2003/54 in electricity and 2003/55 in gas.
For a quick review of the infringement procedures opened by the European Commission against Member
States
for
failure
to
transpose
directive
2003/54,
see
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/152&language=en.
26
Communication from the Commission, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) (January, 2007).
27
Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying the legislative package on the internal market
for electricity and gas: Impact assessment (2007).
28
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
12
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third energy package focused again on the achievement of the internal energy market
which would pave the way for significantly increasing the consumer choice, keeping
prices “as low as possible”, maintaining an environmentally sustainable framework and
improving the standards of security of supply.29
On the electricity front, the above mentioned pitfalls of the market functioning
were addressed through specific measures. Thus, the European Commission initial
proposal sought to move forward on the degree of separation of generating and supply
activities from network operation by promoting ownership unbundling, which should
lead to “eliminate conflict of interests, promote network investment and prevent any
discriminatory behavior”.30 While both transmission and distribution activities are
subject to unbundling requirements, the European Commission particularly focused on
the separation at the transmission level given its key role in broadening cross border
flows, what could in turn drive the integration of EU electricity market.31
As an alternative to the ownership unbundling option, the European Commission
authorized the vertically integrated companies to preserve the ownership over the
network provided that its management was entirely run, “in terms of operations and
investments”32, by an independent undertaking, the so-called Independent System
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation
(EC) No 1228/2003.
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No
1775/2005.
Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC.
Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC.
29
Directive 2009/72, supra note 28.
30
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursuant to the second subparagraph
of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the common position of the Council on the adoption of a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market
in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC. Section 2 (p. 3).
31
Neelie Kroes, Improving competition in European Energy markets through effective unbundling, 31
Fordham Int'l L.J. 1387, 1419 (May 2008).
32
Id. at 1418.
13
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Operator (ISO).33 While the European Commission expressed its strong preference for
an option that would completely exclude the incumbents from the ownership over
transmission wires –being considered as essential facilities for the functioning of the
electric industry-, it reluctantly accepted that an effective34 implementation of the ISO
alternative might lead to the same results.35
Additionally, the European Commission’s energy proposal sought to eradicate
some other pitfalls of the electricity market by increasing the powers granted to the
National Energy Regulators. This measure should particularly lead to an enhanced
overview of the electricity markets. Additionally, the proposal imposed compulsory
cooperation between Member States in issues related to cross border electricity
networks, including coordination of investment schemes in transmission lines.36
Against this background, the final version approved in 2009 of the pieces of
legislation composing the third energy package, and particularly the directive 2009/72
concerning common rules for the Internal Market in electricity, diluted some of the key
aspects initially included in the proposal. Particularly, a third alternative for the
separation of generation and supply activities from the network operation was finally
included at the request of some Member States.37 This new approach (referred to as the

33

Directive 2009/72, supra note 28, art. 13.
Effective implementation implies, amongst other factors and according to the Directive 2009/72, a
complete ten-year network development plan, to be approved by the regulatory authority. Directive
2009/72, supra note 28, art.13.2.c.
35
See speech of Neelie Kroes, former European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Structural
Reforms to the Energy Market, Brussels (27 February 2008).
36
Another aspect that was tackled by the European Commission’s proposal related to the mergers
operations in which companies from non EU countries intend to acquire, directly or indirectly, electricity
network infrastructures within the boundaries of the European Union. The proposed regulation sought to
require non EU entities to comply with the same unbundling requirements as EU companies, giving the
European Commission authority to intervene should the unbundling standards were not fulfilled.
37
France and Germany led the group of countries dissenting from the ownership unbundling proposal.
Whether this position was truly based on an elaborated reasoning of the virtues of mechanisms implying a
certain degree of vertical integration or, conversely, on a more mundane motivation implicitly related to
the support of national companies is beyond the scope of this paper though.
Numerous dissertations on the appropriateness of an ownership unbundled option have been written. See
for instance Michael Pollitt, The arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy
transmission networks, ENERGY POLICY 36, 704–713 (2008).
34
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“Independent Transmission Operator” –ITO-38) enables “transmission system operators
to remain part of integrated undertakings but provides for detailed rules on autonomy,
independence and investment, plus a specific revision clause which can lead to
legislative proposals of the Commission”.39 While the European Commission has
abided by the compromise reached between the European Parliament and the Council
on this issue, its concerns about the risk of an ineffective implementation of this ITO
alternative -that might replicate the pitfalls of past regulation- have been reflected in
some of the pronouncement of its representatives.
Being still 12 months away from the actual deadline for the implementation of the
bulk of the third energy package into the different national legislations (Member States
are required to bring into force the legislative measures necessary to comply with the
electricity directive by 3 March 2011), it is still too soon to determine whether these
regulatory enhancements are successful in their endeavor of bringing up the completion
of the liberalization and integration process.
However, interestingly enough, apart from the regulatory measures put forwarded
by means of legislative proposals, the European Commission has acknowledged, at least
in theory, the need of addressing some of the ills of the electricity markets –particularly
those related to structural market conditions- by means of a “stricter” enforcement of
competition law rules (both on the EU merger control and antitrust fronts). This will not
necessarily mean that mergers in the electricity industry are going to be persistently
banned for the sake of attaining the regulatory goals40, but that a closer scrutiny –

38

Directive 2009/72, supra note 28, chapter 5.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursuant to the second subparagraph
of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the common position of the Council on the adoption of a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market
in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC.
40
The European Commission itself acknowledged in its 2004 Strategy paper for the internal electricity
market the benefits resulting from merger operations in the electricity sector (particularly the economies
of scale and scope), stating that “[e]lectricity companies should not, in principle, be prevented from
taking such actions to improve their performance provided that customers are protected from
39
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focused on the actual effects of a merger in the effective competition- should be
undertaken.
c. General approach to the merger control in different jurisdictions.
Specific features of the electricity markets
While being a prerequisite for the liberalization of the electricity markets,
regulatory initiatives such as third party access requirements cannot reach that goal by
themselves. Effective economic regulation is a key driver for bringing real competition
to the electricity industry, and amongst other tools, merger regulation rules play a major
role. Within the framework of successive waves of merger operations taking place in the
energy sector during the last 20 years, merger control enforcement has been
increasingly but inconsistently used to limit market power in the electricity field,
especially as a result of the burdensome (and not always effective) alternative consisting
of using some measures associated to sector-specific regulation for that same purpose
(such as price caps or capacity obligations).41
Now, side by side with the new regulatory framework approved in the electricity
sector, true time for merger control could have come, becoming the “missing link” required
in order to avoid an “undesirable” fourth energy package. However, it is necessary to verify
whether the merger control is “well equipped” in order to play that role.

When it comes to the enforcement of merger control regulation, a comparison
between the US and EU systems (leading jurisdictions in the application of competition
law) could result an obscure mission, especially if its outcome is supposed to be

monopolistic or oligopolistic practices and that new entrants and smaller companies are not unduly
disadvantaged”, DG energy and transport “Strategy paper: medium term vision for the internal electricity
market” p.16 (1 March 2004).
41
For instance, see Gilbert, R. and D. Newbery paper “Electricity merger policy in the shadow of
regulation”, and particularly the reference to the US experience suggesting that regulatory measures to
limit market power implies “continuous monitoring of deregulated electricity markets. Such monitoring
incurs a risk of intrusive intervention”. In their view, previous experiences such as the California energy
crisis would serve as a support to opt for structural remedies over behavioral remedies.
.
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measured in terms of blocked transactions as a result of the review. In fact, as it has
been advanced in previous sections, this paper supports a model of merger control
consistent with the objectives of the merger analysis at both sides of the Atlantic (at
least when it comes to the DOJ and the European Commission), and therefore an
approach that analyzes mergers through the lens of the real competition concerns that
might arise from those transactions.
Thus, the test applied to review concentrations in the electricity industry will not
require a substantially different procedure from the one undertaken when reviewing
concentrations in other fields, but just a framework flexible enough to accommodate the
specific features of the electricity markets. Statistics in terms of transactions blocked by
one or another authority would be otherwise misleading.
Indeed, while a superficial analysis might lead us to conclude that the EU
approach could have driven a more interventionist system (based on specific cases
cleared in the US and blocked on the European Commission front42), the application of
a substantive test of dominance in the EU until 2004 -in contraposition to the substantial
lessening of competition test applied in US43- implied some major enforcement gaps at
the European Union level. Then again, as it will be exposed in following sections, the
Merger Policy Statement applied by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(particularly its Appendix A) has also been subject to criticism when it comes to its
effectiveness in screening potential anticompetitive consequences derived from a
merger operation taking place in the context of the electric industry.
In the electricity markets, an in-depth scrutiny of the mergers turns out
particularly important, as all “megawatts” do not count equally in terms of potential
42

See for instance the operation M 2220, GE (General Electric) /Honeywell (2001). In this respect, see
François Lévêque, Merger Control: More Stringent in Europe than in the United-States?, CERNA Working Paper (November 2007).
43
A concrete explanation of the different substantive test applied by the European Commission as well as
by different authorities at the US federal level are further developed in sections 3 and 4 of this paper.
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wielding of market power. An efficient merger control should hence take these factors
into consideration. As it will be noted in following sections, strengths and weaknesses
can be identified in the merger review undertaken by the different US and EU
authorities. The flaws are generally related to the use of analysis which are too
dependent on market shares findings. The excessively narrow application of noncompetitive factors by some EU Member States will be also discussed.
For the moment, there are some basic characteristics of the electricity markets
that render this industry atypical and which are relevant to grasp the challenges of the
merger control. They could be depicted as follows. First, electricity is non-storable and
must be produced simultaneously with consumption. Indeed, the electric industry
requires a constant balance between demand and supply over a certain area. Second,
being a network industry, the electricity sector is disaggregated into 4 stages, i.e.
generation, transmission, distribution and supply. It is broadly established that the
generation and supply activities are the fields where a competitive environment is likely
to thrive. Conversely, transmission and distribution activities still remain natural
monopolies, with their main players owning infrastructures to which the rest of the
market participants need to have access in order to develop their activities. Partly
induced by the economies of scale and the high-investments that are required at least in
some parts of the chain, electricity markets tend to remain highly concentrated and
vertically integrated.
Third, the demand of electricity is highly inelastic, particularly in those
jurisdictions where the final consumers enjoy price caps. As a result, the prices of
electricity at the wholesale market can barely be disciplined by a reaction of the demand
(i.e. decrease in consumption) and hence, in the absence of some additional factors (e.g.
abundant generation capacity), the odds for exercising market power increase.
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Additionally, there exists a clear difference between types of generators; thus, the socalled baseload generation units44, given some of their features –amongst others, low
marginal costs and relative technical inability to switch on/ switch off their production
of energy-, do not set the electricity price in a spot market45 (a commodities market in
which electricity is bought and sold in a daily and intra-daily basis). Accordingly, these
power generators are less likely to have the ability, on their own, to manipulate prices.
On the contrary, peak plants46 are power plants that generally run only when there is a
high demand for electricity -known as peak demand-. They have the ability to ramp up
or ramp down their production of electricity and usually set the price of the electricity
(depending on the fuel, technology used, etc.). Therefore, when analyzing a merger,
competition authorities have to consider not only the number of megawatts disposed but
the merging companies (market shares in a given market) but also the particular features
of a specific generator (for instance, whether one of the merging companies dispose of
marginal units that could set the clearing prices).
Another particularly relevant factor to be considered when analyzing mergers in
the electricity sector refers to the growing use of different types of natural gas-fired
generation technologies, leading gas to become a significant input in the production of

electricity. Thus, while gas-fired plants usually represent a minority of the electricity

44

Base load plants include amongst others coal-fired plants, some hydroelectric generators and nuclear
power plants.
45
Spot markets have been recognized as a milestone in the introduction of competition to the electricity
generation markets. Roughly speaking, the price, which is set based on demand and supply factors, is the
same for all the producers, regardless the different marginal costs. As explained by Professor Peter
Cramton, “Buyers submit demand bids and sellers submit supply offers. The auctioneer then forms the
aggregate supply and demand curves, and finds the clearing price at which supply and demand balance;
that is, where the supply and demand curves cross. All demand bids above the clearing price and all
supply offers below the clearing price are accepted. The winning buyers pay the clearing price and the
winning sellers are paid the clearing price for their accepted quantities.”(Foreword to report elaborated
by Professor Ross Baldick on “Single Clearing Price in Electricity Markets”, February 2009.)
The volatility of prices that might result from this mechanism can be mitigated, amongst others, through
limited long-term contracts or financial systems to hedge risks, such as the over-the-counter markets. In
some cases, electricity imports from other adjacent markets can also help to discipline market prices and
hence limit potential market power.
46
Gas-fired plants are one of the most significant examples of peaking power plants.
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generation (mainly dominated by nuclear or coal sources47), natural gas has usually
been positioned as the common marginal fuel, that it’s to say, the energy source used by
the power plants that submit the last accepted offer in a spot market and, therefore, the
units that set the electricity price at a given time.48 Accordingly, mergers between gas
and electricity companies can be observed as vertical integration with a potential to
bring competition concerns; indeed, it does not result difficult to figure out the incentive
for a gas company acquiring an electricity undertaking to raise the prices of gas,
resulting in higher proceeds stemming from the electricity production of its new
acquired company. Another result of this kind of vertical merger operations can consist
of discrimination on the gas supplied to competitors in the electricity market.
Finally, due to some extent to the already referred lack of storability, the system
frequently needs capacity reserve for generation as well as significant transmission
capacity that might guarantee the security of supply at all the times. Due to the
limitation of transmission infrastructures, the congestion management as well as the
geographical distribution of the plants also remain important elements to be taken into
consideration in this industry.

47

One exception to this principle occurs in Texas, where 50% of the electricity is generated from gasfired power plants. L.LYNNE KIESLING and ANDREW N. KLEIT, ELECTRICITY
RESTRUCTURING: THE TEXAS STORY, p. 37 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 2009).
48
For a further explanation on the weight of fuel costs in the electricity prices, see Kenneth Rose, The
Impact of Fuel Costs on Electric Power Prices, 2007, available at:
http://www.appanet.org/files/PDFs/ImpactofFuelCostsonElectricPowerPrices.pdf
An overview of the current US electric power markets could also be found at the following FERC website
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp
20

Electricity merger control in the light of the EU “Third energy package”

3. US Merger Control in the electricity markets
a. Multiplicity of Authorities: a special focus on DOJ and FERCs
jurisdiction to review mergers in the electricity industry
While there are thresholds in the EU that, in the majority of the cases, enable to
determine whether a merger shall be analyzed under the EU merger control rules or by
the national competition authorities49, the US approach to merger review in the
electricity sector implies that numerous authorities are entitled to intervene in the
analysis of a takeover. The Department of Justice (DOJ) as well as –at least
theoretically- the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), the States Public Utilities Commission, States Attorneys General
and Private Plaintiffs might be involved in the analysis of a merger operation within the
electricity sector. Such a multiplicity of merger reviews, and particularly the shared
jurisdiction between FERC and FTC/DOJ at a federal level, has raised some
reservations about the efficiency of the system, particularly as a result of the high costs
that numerous merger analyses might imply both for the concerned companies and the
taxpayers.
Notwithstanding that underlying question, and even if states do have the right to
analyze certain aspects of merger operations in the electricity sector (it has occurred in
certain occasions that state agencies have blocked merger transactions already cleared

49

When the European Commission, based on different thresholds reviewed later in this paper, is not
competent to analyze a particular merger under the EU merger regulation 139/2004, the transaction might
fall under the jurisdiction of various national competition authorities as well as the pertinent national
regulatory authorities, according to the merger approval procedure established in each Member State. In
those cases, while the above mentioned EU merger regulation provides in its recitals, and particularly in
its article 22, with the possibility to request that “[o]ne or more member states may request the
Commission to examine any concentration as defined in Article 3 that does not have a Community
dimension within the meaning of Article 1 but affects trade between member states and threatens to
significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States making the request”, the
non-mandatory nature of the request for referral as well as the right of any Member State to oppose to it
render the analysis of a merger by a multiplicity of authorities a real scenario.
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by the rest of the competent authorities)50, the following analysis will exclusively focus
on the merger review powers attributed to FTC/DOJ and FERC.51
As for the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, both Institutions share
jurisdiction in the review of merger operations. When it comes to the energy field,
however, the clearance process whereby these two agencies determine which of them
will tackle a particular operation has traditionally resulted on the DOJ being granted the
review of mergers involving electricity-related companies.
The pre-merger review process52 applied by the DOJ, as the one undertaken by
FTC in the gas-related takeovers, aims at watching over the principles established in the
section 7 of the Clayton Act that prohibits mergers and acquisitions “where in any line
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly”.53 Likewise, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act54 - forbidding contracts,
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce as well as
monopolization and attempts to do so-, might apply to hypothetical anticompetitive
consequences stemming from merger operations.

50

One of the alleged reasons asserted in 2006 by Exelon Corp. and Public Services Enterprise Group
(PSEG) to abandon the proposed merger between these two companies after two years of merger review
proceedings, consisted of the conditions imposed by the New Jersey regulator to the operation that, at that
moment, had received the approval – in some instances subject to conditions- of other federal and state
agencies. The transaction, should it had finally fructified, would have resulted in one of the largest energy
companies in the US. For a further analysis of this operation and the analysis undertaken by the federal
authorities, see Wolak, Frank and Shawn McRae, Market Analysis in Restructured Electricity Supply
Industries: The Proposed PSEG and Exelon Merger, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (2006).
51
For a further approach to the merger control applied by the Public Utility Commissions, see Carl R.
Peterson and Karl A. McDermott, Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Electric Industry: State
Regulatory Policies for Reviewing Today’s Deals, 20 ELECTRICITY JOURNAL (Jan./Feb. 2007).
52
See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1997 and Supp.2002).The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires the concerned
companies to provide the FTC and the DOJ with information about mergers and acquisitions prior to the
completion of the operation. A similar system is established at the EU level through article 4 of
Regulation 139/2004, requiring notification to the European Commission of mergers with a Community
dimension –as defined in that Regulation- “prior to their implementation and following the conclusion of
the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest.”
53
15 U.S.C. &18.
54
15 U.S.C. &1.
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In this respect, the review of mergers under the foregoing principles does not only
refer to the most common horizontal concentrations between two companies competing
in the same market, but also affect, particularly as a result of the Supreme Court
decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States55, to vertical and conglomerate mergers.
The application of section 7 of the Clayton Act to non-horizontal operations56 turns out
to be particularly relevant in the electricity sector given the characteristics of this
industry, in which vertical issues are likely to arise (such as potential discrimination
resulting from power generating companies owning transmission infrastructures57 or the
increasing dependence of electricity generator units on gas and gas-related
infrastructures).
Particularly, the already mentioned role of gas as a key fuel in the production of
electricity has been increasingly stressed in the last decades, turning into a particular
area of concern in the context of merger control. Additionally, the gas companies are
considered the best suited players to become -in the mid-term- potential competitors in
the electricity markets58; consequently, in practice, the acquisition of a gas company by
an electricity undertaking might entail the loss of direct competition in the electricity

55

370 U.S. 294 (1962). For further discussion on the incorporation of vertical mergers to the scope of
review under section 7 of the Clayton Act, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 439 (3d ed. 2008).
56
As defined by the non-horizontal merger guidelines originally issued as part of “U.S. Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines”, on 14 June 1984, non horizontal mergers involve “firms that do not operate
in the same market”. EU Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers define vertical mergers
as operations involving “companies operating at different levels of the supply chain. For example, when a
manufacturer of a certain product (the ‘upstream firm’) merges with one of its distributors (the
‘downstream firm’)”. In turn, conglomerate mergers are defined as “mergers between firms that are in a
relationship which is neither horizontal (as competitors in the same relevant market) nor vertical (as
suppliers or customers)”.
57
As already advanced in previous notes, the unbundling of the transmission networks from potentially
competitive activities such as the electricity generation has become a wide spread tendency across the
different electricity systems in the world. Different levels of separation have been imposed though,
ranging from the more “drastic” ownership unbundling –implying different owners for different
activities- to softer alternative such as the functional and accounting unbundling. For some principal
basics on unbundling trends, see OECD/INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, COMPETITION IN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS (OECD ed., 2001).
58
See Richard Gilbert and David Newbery, Electricity Merger Policy in the Shadow of Regulation,
University of California Energy Institute Policy & Economics (2006).
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relevant market. Accordingly, even if in general terms non-horizontal mergers are
broadly considered as less propitious to create competitive concerns59, the close review
of the effects resulting from vertical transactions remains essential in the electricity
field. In this respect, apart from the horizontal merger guidelines jointly adopted by the
DOJ and FTC in 1992 and amended in 1997, the DOJ disposes of the non horizontal
merger guidelines. It is however surprising that since their approval in 1984 few, if any,
vertical concentrations have been challenged by the FTC/DOJ.
On the regulatory front, Section 203 of Federal Power Act confers to FERC
authority in order to review merger operations in the electricity sector. It accordingly
lays down that no public utility shall sell, lease or dispose of any facility subject to the
jurisdiction of FERC without a prior authorization granted from that Commission.60 In
this respect, according to the Federal Power Act, all the facilities used for the interstate
wholesale transmission or sale of electric energy fall under the jurisdiction of FERC
(being therefore excluded of the jurisdiction of this Commission all activities related to
the retail electricity markets).
Particularly, Section 203(a)(4) of the Federal Power Act establishes that
“the Commission shall approve the proposed disposition, consolidation,
acquisition, or change in control, if it finds that the proposed transaction will be
consistent with the public interest, and will not result in cross-subsidization of a nonutility associate company or the pledge or encumbrance of utility assets for the benefit

59

Particularly the Chicago School has traditionally maintained that vertical integration reached by means
of corporate operations leads to substantial efficiencies and, therefore, should not be hampered.
In the EU, the European Commission, while recognizing the potential harmful effect of vertical mergers,
states in its Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers that “non-horizontal mergers are
generally less likely to significantly impede effective competition than horizontal mergers”, principally as
a result of the potential efficiencies stemmed from the operation as well as the absence of “loss of direct
competition between the merging firms in the same relevant market”. As it has been pointed out before in
this paper, such an approach, while being acceptable in theory, does not always result appropriate in the
electricity industry given, amongst others, the nature of the gas companies as potential competitors in the
electricity markets.
60
16 U.S.C. & 824b(a) (1994).
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of an associate company unless the Commission determines that the cross-subsidization,
pledge or encumbrance will be consistent with the public interest”.61
In order to determine whether the public interest is put in jeopardy by means of a
merger operation, FERC issued a Merger Policy Statement in 1996. Its implementation
is analyzed in the following sub-section together with the approach undertaken by DOJ
regarding concentrations in the electricity sector.
b. Approaches to merger operations in the electricity sector
The DOJ approach to merger operations in the electricity sector does not
substantially differ from the treatment given to concentrations in any other industry.
The analysis undertaken is basically set in the FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines62 and, as succinctly defined in their overview, the procedure revolves around
five principal steps that, as a final goal, are supposed to determine whether “the merger
is likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise”.63
In brief, after a first stage in which the DOJ gauges the effects in terms of market
concentration that might stem from the merger (which requires DOJ a preliminary work
defining the product and geographic markets), the agency engages in a second step
aiming at assessing, based on market concentration and other particular market features,
the potential adverse competitive effects that the merger might raise. In a third stage, the
DOJ determines whether the potential anticompetitive effects encountered in previous
phases might be counteracted by entry opportunities to the concerned market. Finally, in
a fourth and fifth steps the agency respectively analyses the possibilities to achieve the
gain efficiencies alleged by the companies by other means and whether “but for the
merger, either party to the transaction would be likely to fail, causing its assets to exit
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENERGY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK (2002)
U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552
(1992).
63
Id.
62

25

Electricity merger control in the light of the EU “Third energy package”

the market.”64
The procedural review of mergers under DOJ according to the above mentioned
five-steps process should not mislead the reader though; hence, it would be erroneous to
assume that should the first phase results in an absence of relevant market concentration
an automatic clearance of the operation would be granted.65 In fact, the Guidelines warn
at several occasions from a mechanical application of the abovementioned process,
stating that the Authority in charge of the merger review will apply the standards
“reasonably and flexibly to the particular facts and circumstances of each proposed
merger”.66
In that sense, the authors of the Guidelines (DOJ and FTC) confirmed the
evolution in the assessment of market concentration in merger operations initiated by
the US Supreme Court in 1974 in its General Dynamics decision.67 In that case, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the analysis of the market concentration provides a
first indicator but, nonetheless, no final decision can be made solely upon these results
given the fact that both market share and market concentration findings may “either
understate or overstate the likely future competitive significance of a firm or firms in the
market or the impact of a merger”68 .
On the electricity front, and particularly in the context of a hypothetical merger
between undertakings acting in the generation market, the sole analysis of the market
64

Id.
For determining the degree of market concentration in a given market, the Guidelines refer to the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which basically consists of a sum of the squared market share of
each of the market participants. Based on the result of the post-merger HHI, the Guidelines provide
certain standards in order to determine whether a merger would likely result in anticompetitive effects.
Beyond a post-merger HHI of 1000, the DOJ will measure the HHI increase comparing the situation
before and after the concentration. For a further detail of the application of this standard at both sides of
the Atlantic- the use of HHI has also been adopted by the EU competition authorities-, see Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, §1.5 and EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras.16 and 19-21.
66
Merger Guidelines §0.
67
United States v General Dynamics Corp, 415 US 486 (1974). The Supreme Court moved away in this
decision from a prior “structuralist” approach that relied on the conclusions drawn from the concerned
companies’ market share and degree of concentration.
68
Horizontal Merger Guidelines §1.52.
65
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shares and concentration levels could lead to overstate the competitive significance of
the operation should the merging entities just disposed of large market shares of inframarginal generation capacity (“baseload” generation units that, given some of their
features –amongst others, low marginal costs and technical inability to ramp up or ramp
down their production of energy– do not set the electricity price in a spot market)69. In
such a hypothetical case, a merger review which would confer an absolute value to the
market concentration analysis would likely consider the existence of anticompetitive
effects. However, regardless the market share or post-merger market concentration, the
resulting company would not have gained -as a result of the merger- any ability to
exercise market power by manipulating the electricity prices. Conversely, the outcome
of a merger operation in which the concerned companies only disposed of limited
market shares in peaking plants (as referred in previous sections, these plants usually set
the price in a given spot market)70 would be easily predictable should the merger
analysis finalized at the first step.
Additionally, the existence of potential vertical issues -implying competitive
concerns in the electricity sector- calls for further analysis beyond the market
concentration scrutiny. For these reasons, regardless the result obtained in the first step
in terms of level of market concentration, the fact that the DOJ keeps on analyzing the
merger potential effects on competition represents a guarantee of a more trustworthy
merger control approach.71
According to the Merger Horizontal Guidelines, the DOJ continues its analysis by
reviewing the possible anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger, opportunities for

69

For an analysis of the merger review applied within the framework of the Exelon/ PSEG proposed
merger, see also Dennis W. Carlton, Mergers in Regulated Industries: Electricity, (December 2007).
70
See sub-section 2.c of this paper.
71
We will depict later in this section some cases where the absence of that continuity in the analysis
prevents the authority itself from appraising the actual consequences of a merger over the effective
competition.
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other players to enter the relevant markets and possible efficiencies stemming from the
operation. Within this framework, it is noteworthy that the abovementioned goal of the
merger review (namely, determining the odds of the merger to substantially lessen
competition) remains the leitmotiv of the subsequent stages of the analysis.
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, but also the relatively recent Comments to
these guiding documents72 as well as the general trend of the decisions of the courts in
merger cases73, point at two not mutually exclusive scenarios that, arising from a given
merger, might lead to the lessening of competition. First, the increased of coordinated
interaction between the market participants, which includes tacit or express “actions by
a group of firms that are profitable for each of them only as a result of the
accommodating reactions of the others.”74 Second, unilateral exercise of market power,
primarily consisting of the possibility that the merger may lead to price rises or output
suppressions carried out by the resulting company due to the incentives arising as a
consequence of the merger. For instance, a merger between close competitors –that
before the transaction competed in prices- will result in a less constraining scenario that
might spur rises in the prices set by the entity resulting from the corporate merger. As
the FTC/DOJ point out in their Commentary to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a
merger resulting in a monopoly is the most obvious case where unilateral effects are
likely to result. However, other variables such as the unilateral conducts that might
arise from mergers not even leading to a dominant position of the resulting merged firm
(as it frequently happens in oligopolistic markets such as the electric industry) are also
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In 2006, the DOJ and the FTC jointly published the “Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines” in order to “provide greater transparency and foster deeper understanding regarding
antitrust law enforcement”.
73
See for instance FTC v H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 724-25 (D.C. Circ. 2004) when it comes to
coordinated interaction; and FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) as regards unilateral
behaviors.
74
Horizontal Merger Guidelines §2.1. For a further analysis of the DOJ and FTC analysis of coordinated
effects, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 148 (3d ed. 2008).
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subject to the review of the DOJ pursuant to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines75.
In the context of mergers in the electricity markets, and particularly in the
concentration operation between Exelon Corporation ("Exelon") and Public Service
Enterprise Group Incorporated ("PSEG")76, the DOJ pointed at potential anticompetitive
non-coordinated effects, alleging that the merger would result in a substantially
lessening of competition by facilitating “Exelon's incentive and ability to reduce output
and raise market prices”. Indeed, given the characteristics of the generation units owned
at the time by the merging companies (a mix of baseload and peaking plants) the
chances for profitably withholding certain electric output (particularly marginal units
that set the clearing prices in the spot market in most of the hours) would clearly
increase. The physical or economical withholding would most likely imply that a more
expensive generation plant would set the clearing price, increasing the benefits of most
of the units of the resulting merged firm.
In that same case, the DOJ held the improbable chances of new entries in the
fields of transmission or generation, deeming that “entry through the construction of
new generation or transmission capacity would not be timely, likely, and sufficient to
deter or counteract an anticompetitive price increase. Given the necessary
environmental, safety, and zoning approvals required, it would take many years for
such new entry to take place”.77 Thus, even if in theory market entry can be considered
as a way to mitigate competition concerns derived from a merger, in the electricity
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The review of potential post-merger non-coordinated conducts of non dominant companies traditionally
applied by the DOJ/FTC contrasted for a long time with the “dominance test” applied by the European
Commission until 2004, which, by making dominance a necessary requirement, prevented the
competition authority to challenge anticompetitive concentrations not leading to the creation of a market
dominant company (frequently occurring in mergers between companies producing close substitutes).
This so-called “enforcement gap” of the EU merger regulation, was finally closed by the new Regulation
139/2004 and its new “SIEC” merger test, explained in following sections of this paper. For a closer
debate of this issue, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Sven B. Volcker and G. Axel Gutermuth, Unilateral
effects: the enforcement gap under the old EC Merger regulation (World Competition, 2005).
76
Supra note 50.
77
U.S. Department of Justice (2006) U.S. v. Exelon Corp., Case No. 1:06CV01138 (D.D.C 2006).
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sector –and particularly in the context of not fully liberalized markets-, existing entry
barriers frequently thwart this merger defense. The oligopolistic structures usually
existing in the electric industry -occasionally in conjunction with some governmental
regulation78- do not usually favor entries that, according to the Merger Guidelines, must
be “timely, likely and sufficient”.79
At this stage of the review, in spite of some anticompetitive effects detected by
DOJ in a given proposed merger, the operation will still be eligible for a “green light”
should it entails certain efficiencies that otherwise could not be reached (that is to say,
merger-specific efficiencies).80 However, the weight to be given to such efficiencies
(i.e. the extent to which anticompetitive effects will be offset by given efficiencies) is
still largely debated and not clearly predictable. In order to be taken into consideration
by the DOJ, the efficiencies shall not imply reductions in output or service, will be
verifiable (vague assertions regarding the benefits of the merger will therefore not
qualify), and shall address variable costs of production.81 Efficiencies leading to quality
improvements and, eventually, to price raises might also be considered as acceptable
under certain circumstances though.
Finally, for those cases where, given its anticompetitive potential, the operation
cannot be cleared in the same terms as it was filed, the DOJ adopted in October 2004 a
guide setting the key principles for evaluating commitments proposed by companies.82
As provided in these guidelines, these measures try “to prevent the anticompetitive
78

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING
THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 204 (3d ed. 2008), in which it is evoked the case United States v. Enova
Corp., 63 Fed. Reg. 33,396 (DOJ June 18, 1998) where the regulations on environment and safety issues,
amongst others, “were found as barriers to entry the electricity market”.
79
Horizontal Merger Guidelines §3.1.
80
Horizontal Merger Guidelines §4.The EU incorporated the analysis of efficiencies to its merger review
by means of the Regulation 139/2004. The lack of actual application of this merger defense is an issue
that will be discussed in the following section.
81
Efficiencies addressing variable costs of production are more likely to be translated into final price
reductions. By contrast, fixed cost efficiencies frequently imply outputs cuts. See commentary to
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57. See also Mike Walker, Have the economic approaches to merger
control in the EC and US converged, (International Comparative Legal Guide to Merger Control, 2005).
82
Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, October 2004.
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effects likely to result from a merger that the Commission has determined is
unlawful”.83 Interestingly enough, according to the Guide to merger remedies, the final
objective of the remedy does not consist of enhancing premerger competition, “but to
restore it”. This guiding principle, which differs from the philosophy underlying the EU
merger control approach (where apart from the restoration of premerger competition,
the merger control enforcement seeks to “develop effective competition in the common
market”84), constitutes a key element upon which potential remedies will be defined.
The enforceability of the commitments and their configuration upon application of
“sound legal and economic principles” to the circumstances of the transaction, also
remain important aspects to be analyzed.
Accordingly, the DOJ has typically opted for structural rather than behavioral
remedies, as expressly recognized in the Guide. This preference for structural actions
(mostly in the form of divestitures) is not unusual in the merger control enforcement
landscape, being shared –in addition to the FTC at the US level- by the European
Commission in the context of the EU merger control enforcement.85
While this approach is intended to avoid expensive and time consuming
government entanglement in the market (as it frequently occurs with behavioral
measures that are developed during a limit timeframe and imply higher supervision), it
should not be overlooked that the final objective of these commitments consists of
restoring competition. In the electricity sector, the right to access to some essential
infrastructures might be a better (or at least additional) measure to achieve that goal.
83

Id.
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, recital 23.
85
Other aspects that are taken into consideration in the procedure of assessment of potential remedies (in
which the European Commission and DOJ approaches are quite similar) refer to the preference for
divestitures of existing business entities. As defined in the Guide, business entities refer to units that
“ha[ve] already demonstrated [their] ability to compete in the relevant market” U.S. Department of
Justice, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, 12 (2004). Likewise, the identity and features of possible
buyers and the requirements for the divested assets to render the purchaser an effective, long-term
competitor in the market are also factors to be considered by DOJ.
84
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That is to say: the simplicity of the implementation of structural remedies should not
prevail over the analysis of the real contribution of a commitment to restoring
competition. In practice, however, the DOJ supports only under stringent circumstances
“stand-alone conduct-based remedies”, which, in general, serve to underpin additional
structural measures. The DOJ also admits behavioral remedies in some cases where the
efficiencies sought by the merger would be sacrificed if divestitures were made. As it
will be discussed in following sections when exposing the approach of the EU to
commitments proposed by the merging parties, competition authorities should be
flexible enough to admit behavioral remedies given their potential to fit into the electric
industry needs. Hence, these conditions should not be automatically disregarded.
Finally, it should be noted that, in spite of their significant value in determining
whether or not challenging a merger, the Merger guidelines are not binding neither on
the FTC/DOJ nor on the federal courts, the latter being ultimately the authorities
retaining the power to block a transaction.86 As it will be further developed in the
following sections, the immediacy of the judicial review of a decision taken by the
competition authority remains one of the divergences between the US and the EU
approach to merger control.
When it comes to the approach to mergers undertaken by FERC, as stated in its
Merger Policy Statement, this Commission scrutinizes three angles of a proposed
merger, namely “the effect on competition, the effect on rates, and the effect on
regulation”. For the purpose of assessing both the effect on rates and regulation, FERC
establishes that companies concerned in a merger operation will be required to propose
86

In addition to some other substantial divergences already mentioned, the procedure followed before the
DOJ differs from the process undertaken in the review of merger operations in the EU, insofar as the US
approach in this case is based on a judicial procedure (contrary to the administrative character of the
merger review undertaken by the European Commission). Thus, in the merger analysis undertaken by
DOJ, the judicial control of the administrative body is exercised simultaneously, while at the European
Union level this control comes in a later stage as a result of the judicial review of European
Commission’s decisions exercised by the European Court of First Instance (now denominated General
Court, as a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon).
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appropriate rate protection for customers as well as commitments that might ensure that
no regulatory impact is provoked as a result of the operation.87
When it comes to the analysis of the effects of mergers on competition, for the
alleged sake of efficiency and in order to avoid unnecessary delays on the analysis of a
merger operation, FERC applies an analytical screen, developed in the Appendix A to
the Merger Policy Statement. Such a test focuses primarily on the FTC/DOJ Guidelines
first step, namely whether the proposed merger will significantly increase concentration
and, hence, shall result in a concentrated market.
According to FERC’s view, by applying an analytic screen based on this first step
of the FTC/DOJ guidelines in an initial stage of the merger review process, “the
Commission will be able to identify proposed mergers that clearly will not harm
competition.” Therefore, it turns out that, while the election of the FTC/DOJ guidelines
as baseline to develop the analysis of a merger could be understood as a minimization of
differences between DOJ and FERC approaches, the simplification of the process by
pursuing an accelerated first screening based on market concentration effects does
adulterate the strengths of the test (particularly with regard to the electricity market due
to its specific features).
Certainly, the approach applied by FERC establishes that whether “applicants
satisfy this analytic screen in their filings” – being the screen mainly carried out and
based on applicant’s efforts and submissions- “they, [the applicants], typically would be
able to avoid a hearing on competition”. The analytic screen, sustained on four main
steps –i.e. identification of relevant product, analysis of geographic markets on the
supply and demand sides88, and analysis of concentration levels-, expressly makes clear
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Effects over state regulation are not considered by FERC, letting the pertinent state commissions
protect their own state interests. Inquiry concerning the Commission’s Policy under the Federal Power
Act: Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595 (1996). (hereinafter the Merger Policy Statement).
88
Merger Policy Statement, refers to the identification of customers who may be affected by the merger
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that if no significantly increase of concentration stems from a merger, “the Commission
will not set this issue for hearing”.
The capacity of manipulating the electricity markets by market participants which
do not significantly increase their market share is ignored by applying this logic. But
even more surprisingly, where significant increases in market concentration do occur,
potential remedies offered by the parties can replace FERC’s analysis of competitive
effects, market entry alternatives and efficiencies.89
In that sense, FERC has clarified -upon request of interested parties about the
sufficiency of the analytic screen- that Policy Statement “help[s] to identify mergers
that have the potential to harm competition, but that the Commission’s review goes
beyond those screens and looks at all relevant factors regarding the effect on
competition.”

90

Even if it is encouraging that FERC recognizes the need of going

beyond the analytic screen91, the analysis of actual effects on competition appears, in
practice, to still be consigned to oblivion.
Explanations of FERC’s approach to mergers frequently point at aspects such as
the absence of sufficient FERC’s powers to wield its functions, and particularly the lack
of subpoena power as well as the use of the analysis provided by the merging parties
(not surprisingly these reports provided by the parties frequently “demonstrate” that the
transaction does not harm competition). Moreover, FERC makes an assumption that,
while reasonable in theory, if misunderstood, can lead this agency to an inappropriate
application of the merger control. Indeed, FERC assumes that the legislature did not
as well as potential suppliers that can compete to serve a given market or customer.
For a comparative analysis of the powers granted to FERC and DOJ within the framework of mergers
in the electricity industry, see Diana L. Moss, Antitrust Versus Regulatory Merger Review: The Case of
Electricity, Rev Ind Organ (2008).
90
See for instance, Supplemental Policy Statement (issued 2/21/2008).
91
FERC’s concerns increasingly focus on the consequences of the mergers that allow -and induce- the
resulting merged firms to withhold output in order to increase the market price. It hence takes into
account that “the ability to withhold output depends on the amount of marginal capacity controlled by the
merged firm, and the incentive to do so depends on the amount of infra-marginal capacity that could
benefit from higher prices”.
89
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intend this Commission to be “hostile” to mergers. However, the risks stemming from a
control that in practice frequently relies upon market concentration levels –ignoring real
effects in competition- might bring undesirable consequences that have nothing to do
with the fact of being hostile to mergers.
Finally, when it comes to the measures proposed in order to address controversial
aspects of a merger, FERC’s approach, contrary to DOJ, lean on behavioral remedies.92
Thus, in several cases FERC subjected its merger clearance to the commitments made
by the merging companies regarding, for instance, the creation or adherence to an
Independent System Operator.93 More recently, FERC decided to foster Regional
Transmission Organizations in the pursuit of the same objective of creating wholesale
markets.94 Such conditions imposed by FERC for the clearance of a merger, which are
closely related to the deregulation energy-policy objective pursued by this regulatory
agency, will be the object of further review in section 5 when considering the
appropriateness of including non-competition considerations in the merger control
analysis.

92

See Moss, supra note 87, where the author illustrates the different approaches to remedies undertaken
by DOJ and FERC, analyzing nine significant mergers where remedial measures were deemed necessary.
According to that analysis “[i]n all cases, FERC remedies were behavioral. In three of the seven cases
reviewed by the DOJ or FTC, behavioral remedies were imposed (PacifiCorp/Energy Group PLC
(Peabody Coal), DTE Energy/ MCN Energy, and CMS Energy/ Panhandle Eastern) but exclusively in
vertical merger cases.”
93
An operator controlling transmission lines owned by its members; the main consequence of that
situation consists of creating competitive wholesale markets, being this a key aspect of the liberalization
process.
94
For a further view of the development of FERC’s goals and resources to achieve those objectives, see
PETER C. CARSTENSEN, SUSAN BETH FARMER, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER
ANALYSIS IN DEREGULATED AND NEWLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES (Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 2008).
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4. EU Merger Control in the electricity markets
While the efforts of the European Commission during the last 15 years have
focused on the integration and liberalization of the EU electricity markets, the statistical
data show us how the business tendency has driven this industry towards a high level of
concentration.95 This effect does not appear to be a unique feature of the European
markets though. Indeed, significant concentration in the electric industry remains a
constant characteristic at both sides of the Atlantic.96 Particularly in the EU, the
liberalization process launched by the EC in the late 1990s was accompanied by a wave
of merger operations that has progressively reduced the number of market participants
in the electricity markets, particularly at the generation and retail levels.97

95

Communication from the Commission: Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) (2007).
Additionally, see PETER CAMERON, “COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS. LAW: LAW AND
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 325, (Oxford ed., 2002), which refers to some of the
reasons underlying the lack of corporate interest of entering into merger operations prior to the adoption
of the First Energy Package, e.g. “compartmentalization of national markets and the use of closed supply
areas” implying a shield for incumbents against competition.
96
Competition in Energy Markets, Study by the UNCTAD secretariat, 26 (2007).
As a possible reason for that trend, Gilbert, R. and D. Newbery’s paper, “Electricity merger policy in the
shadow of regulation” points at the incentives for the gas and electricity companies “to enter each other’s
markets for the final product (gas or electricity supply) and acquiring firms in the other fuel market.”
David Newbery, in its paper “What are the issues in mergers in acquisitions arising from the electricity
markets restructuring?”(Florence School of Regulation, 2007) also points at the mergers between
generation and supply companies in the electricity industry as an appropriate way to reduce risks
stemming from the variation in electricity wholesale prices, which, where no vertical integration occurs,
is more likely to alternatively affect to one or the other activity depending on whether prices are higher or
lower. Generally speaking, high wholesale prices will increase generation profits while striking energy
suppliers, tied to selling contracts to final customers at fixed prices –though hedging these contracts in
“Over the Counter” (OTC) energy markets might mitigate exposure to fluctuations of the prices.
Moreover, non-residential customers are progressively adapting their electricity contracting patterns to
more sophisticated contracts schemes offered by electricity suppliers (indexing electricity prices to
several factors) and, thus, limiting the exposure of the supply activity to variations in the wholesale
prices.
97
See Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity
sectors (Final Report) (2007) carried out by the European Commission in 2005 and 2006.
The impact assessment carried out by the European Commission prior to the launching of the third energy
package proposal in 2007 shows that in countries like France, Greece, Belgium or Estonia, the market
share of the largest generator in the electricity market reached up to a 92,7%. Commission staff working
document, accompanying the legislative package on the internal market for electricity and gas, Impact
assessment, Annex 2 (2007).
Moreover, the report illustrated an average market share of the largest generator in the countries where
legal unbundling had been introduced reaching the 73%. Countries having opted for the ownership
separation of the network functions from the generation and supply activities also retained in 2005
soaring degrees of concentration. See Communication from the Commission to the European Council and
the European Parliament: an Energy Policy for Europe (January, 2007).
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In addition to the existing horizontal concentration, vertical integration of the
different phases of the electrical power industry has also been stressed, particularly
between generation and supply. The not always effective provisions requiring the
unbundling of supply and generation interests from network infrastructures has also
exacerbated the degree of vertical integration.98
As a result, and probably as an unexpected consequence of the liberalization
process, the four or five largest operators currently dominate the electric European
landscape99, whether in their initial national market of reference100 or in other
geographic markets through the companies that they have acquired through subsequent
merger transactions.101
This trend, along with the findings on significant levels of vertical integration as
well as the hoarding of strategic network infrastructures and power generation facilities
by some market players, has obviously drawn the attention of the European
Commission, becoming one of the major concerns of its Directorate General for
Competition. Indeed, conscious of the dangers stemming from both the horizontal
concentration (particularly the risk of exercising market power by dominant players
that, in most of the cases, will result in higher prices for consumers) and vertical
integration102, the European Commission has called for a specific action under the EU
merger control in order to “ensure that the competitive structure in relevant markets
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DG COMPETITION Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, Part II, 169 (January 10, 2007).
See Competition in Energy Markets, Study by the UNCTAD secretariat, 26 (2007).
Particularly, according to the “Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market”
published by the European Commission in 2009, “on the electricity wholesale market, the three biggest
generators still control more than 70% of generation capacity in 15 member states”.
100
EDF/GDF dominate the electricity and gas markets in France, with market shares in both generation
and supply proximate to 90%.
101
E.g. E.ON, RWE, ENEL.
102
Vertical integration provokes, amongst others, the reduction of the incentives to trade on wholesale
markets, decreasing their liquidity when the vertical integration refers to generation and supply activities.
Moreover, it discourages the concession of third party access and reduces the incentives to invest in the
development of the network, when the integration relates to supply and network activities. DG
Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, Part II, 169 (10 January 2007).
99
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does not further deteriorate”.103
Apart from the regulatory measures put forwarded by means of sector-specific
legislative proposals, the European Commission acknowledged the need of addressing
some of the ills of the electricity markets –particularly those related to structural
conditions- through a stricter implementation of competition law (both on the EU
merger control and antitrust fronts).104 Thus, both national and EU competition
authorities are called to play a significant role in order to deal with some of the above
mentioned structural problems of the electricity markets. Furthermore, an appropriate
interaction of initiatives launched on the competition field with the measures undertaken
at a regulatory level has been persistently demanded by both public authorities and
commentators.105
Against this backdrop, the question of whether a different approach to the EU
merger control should be undertaken in order to cope with the goals set in the electricity
field has been raised. A change of direction in the approach of competition authorities to
the merger control might be particularly necessary if the different periodic reports106 to
be issued by the European Commission on the progress of the internal electricity market

103

Communication from the Commission Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC). No 1/2003
into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) Point 42 (January, 10, 2007).
104
Commission staff working document accompanying the legislative package on the internal market for
electricity and gas, 6, 9 (2007).
Communication from the Commission Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC). No 1/2003 into
the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) Point 3 (10 January 2007).
105
It is to be highlighted that in the letter sent on February 2003 by the Office of the Gas and Electricity
Markets (OFGEM, energy regulator for gas and electricity in Great Britain) to the European Commission
Vice President for Transport and Energy, within the context of the Ruhrgas’ acquisition by German
utility E.ON (a transaction analyzed and cleared under the German merger control, that will be further
analyzed in this section), the British regulator already touched on the need of a convenient interaction
between regulation and competition law, asserting that “a competitive single market can only be realised
if an appropriate market structure exists with appropriate regulatory and competition policy regimes
applied at the national and European level”.
See also PETER CAMERON, LEGAL ASPECTS OF EU ENERGY REGULATION, 34 (Oxford ed.,
2005). On the political front, see the speech of Neelie Kroes, the former EU Commissioner for
Competition, The interface between regulation and competition law, 28 April 2009.
106
Directive 2009/72 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, art. 47.
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as well as on the effectiveness of the unbundling provisions contained in the new
legislation reflect poor signals of accomplishment.
In that sense, once that the three consecutive energy packages have laid down
some of the milestones of the liberalization and integration processes and, hence, the
seeds of the competitions are ready to thrive, merger control enforcement might become
the key to avoid future failures of the sector-specific regulation. For the sake of a proper
analysis of the role and challenges of the merger control in those processes, it is
convenient to look first at the EU merger control rules, its evolution through the last six
years and its enforcement within the electricity market.
a. Development of the EU merger control and jurisdiction of the European
Commission
As a matter of fact, the EU merger control has undergone an important
transformation in its approach to merger operations in the last six years. In fact, in 2004
the European Commission culminated its review of the EU merger control rules, a
process initiated years before as a reaction to a series of judgments of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) overruling some of the European Commission’s decisions on
merger operations107 –and probably also due to an internal evolution tending to bestow
the Commission’s economic analysis of merger operations with a greater weight.108

107

While the Case No. T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission meant in 2002 the first sentence of the former
Court of First Instance annulling an European Commission decision on merger operations, several rulings
followed the same path (Case No. T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission 2002; Case No. T-310/01,
Schneider Electric SA v. Commission (2002)).
See ROGER J. VAN DEN BERGH AND PETER D. CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION
LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 3 (2006).
See also EDURNE NAVARRO ET AL., MERGER CONTROL IN THE EU, 4 (Oxford ed., 2d ed.
2005).
In this respect, it is to be reminded that, according to the article 16 of Regulation 139/2004, the Court of
Justice can issue opinions in appeal to the decisions undertaken by the European Commission. Indeed,
that provisions establishes that the Court of Justice “shall have unlimited jurisdiction “(…) ”to review
decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payments; it may cancel, reduce
or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed”.
108
Navarro et al., supra. 107.
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Prior to the modernization of the EU merger control that crystallized through the
enactment in 2004 of the Regulation 139/2004 as well as the set of guidelines on the
assessment of horizontal and non-horizontal corporate concentrations109, the analysis of
mergers and acquisitions undertaken by the European Commission relied on the
scrutiny of the merging companies’ market shares in order to determine whether or not
an operation should be approved. In fact, according to the former Regulation a merger
would be prohibited when it “creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in
a substantial part of it”.110
Regardless of the rights and wrongs of the previous test and the reason that caused
the move, the European Commission passed from a predominantly dominant test to a
more economics-based analysis in which considerations in terms of competitive effects
on consumers and efficiency gains are taken into account (commonly known as “SIEC
test”).111 Specifically, the wording of the Regulation 139/2004 establishes that
“[a]concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the
common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common
market”.112
As it has been advanced in previous sections, while this test brought the EU
merger control together with other international wide-used standards employed to assess
merger operations (and more particularly to the “substantial lessening of competition
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For a comprehensive compilation of the EU rules applicable to merger control, see handbook
published by the European Commission on 24 August 2009.
110
Article 2 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, as amended by Council Regulation No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997.
111
See Paper Mike Walker, “Have the economic approaches to merger control in the EC and US
converged?”, Global competition Review (2005).
112
Art. 2.3 Regulation 139/2004.
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test”113-SLC- used in the US), the SIEC test keeps in a way some of the features of the
old dominance test. However, it broadens its scope in order to include, for instance, the
analysis of the “consequences that concentrations in oligopolistic market structures
may have”.114 It therefore turned out, as it has been defined by different
commentators115, a kind of hybrid between the SLC and the dominance test. A further
detail on the application of this sort of mechanism of presumptions upon which the DG
Competition adopts its decisions on mergers is provided later in this section.
For the moment, and given the abovementioned increasing importance of merger
control as a supplementary tool contributing to the achievement of some of the goals of
the third energy package, we will start discussing where the power of reviewing mergers
in the electricity sector remains and what authority would ideally be in a better position
to assess these issues in the EU arena.
When it comes to the powers of the European Commission to analyze merger
operations within the electricity markets, it is necessary to bear in mind the thresholds
set by the Regulation 139/2004 to define mergers with “Community dimension” (that is
to say, transactions that will fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the European
Commission).116 Indeed, by means of these specific thresholds, the Regulation aims at
113

Art. 7 Clayton Act and Horizontal merger Guidelines.
Recital 25 of Regulation 139/2004.
115
For instance see Neil Horner, European Law, Unilateral Effects and the EC Merger Regulation – How
The Commission Had its Cake and Ate it Too, 11 (2006); as well as Navarro et al, supra. 110.
116
Article 1 of the Regulation 139/2004 defines the scope of the transactions that are subject to the EU
merger control as follows: "[a] concentration has a Community dimension where: (a) the combined
aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5 000 million; and (b)
the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more
than ECU 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State". (Emphasis added).
Article 1.3 further establishes that "[a] concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in
paragraph 2 has a Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all
the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2 500 million; (b) in each of at least three member states,
the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million; (c) in
each of at least three member states included for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each
of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and (d) the aggregate
Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100
114
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clearly delimiting the mergers analyzed by the European Commission from the
operations subject to the scrutiny of national competition authorities, minimizing the
potential conflicts of competence that might arise in this field. This was in fact the
objective of the lawmaker when pointing out in Recital 8 of the Regulation 139/2004
that:
“The provisions to be adopted in this Regulation should apply to significant
structural changes, the impact of which on the market goes beyond the national
borders of any one Member State. Such concentrations should, as a general rule,
be reviewed exclusively at Community level, in application of a ‘one-stop shop’
system and in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Concentrations not
covered by this Regulation come, in principle, within the jurisdiction of the
member states”.
Against this backdrop, the above-mentioned rule on the thresholds that must be
reached in order for a merger to have a Community dimension117 foresees an exception
to the jurisdiction of the European Commission. Indeed, even if the general turnover
thresholds are met, the operation no longer will be qualified as having a Community
dimension if each of the undertakings concerned in the operation “achieves more than
two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member
State”118 (hereinafter, the “Two Thirds Rule”). Thus, operations where large merging
companies carry out the main bulk of their business in one Member State shall fall
under the jurisdiction of the relevant national competition authority.
While the purpose underlying this Two Thirds Rule exception seeks at
establishing a rational framework whereby operations which are clearly focused on one
Member State are overviewed by the closest competition authority, the outcome in the
electricity and gas arena can certainly be unfortunate. As stated in a recently published
million (…)”.
Additionally, recital 17 of Regulation 139/2004 determines the exclusive competence of the European
Commission in applying that Regulation.
117
Unlike the systems set in other jurisdictions (see for instance UK system), the EU approach does not
require a preliminary analysis of the relevant market.
118
Art. 1.2 and 1.3 of Regulation 139/2004.
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report issued by the European Commission119, in the period comprised between 2001
and 2007, the Two Thirds Rule applied in 126 cases, mainly with regard to some of the
largest Member States (particularly France, Germany, Italy and Spain) with
approximately 10% of the cases being related to the energy sector. In this respect, there
is a twofold risk steaming from this exception. On the one hand, as the European
Commission has repeatedly pointed out, because of the application of the Two Thirds
Rule, operations with potential cross-border effects might escape its scrutiny.120 On the
other hand, the European Commission’s concerns resulting from that lack of authority
have been exacerbated due to the bias shown by some Member States, favoring their
own interests when scrutinizing mergers in the energy field.
The former source of risk has been expressly asserted by the European
Commission, stating that the extent to which “some of the transactions between large
firms falling under the two-thirds rule are capable of having a significant impact on
market structures and on competition beyond the confines of a single Member State” is
easily appraised.121 According to the European Commission’s reasoning -with which
this paper agrees-, a merger involving national markets that, due in part to the existence
of a high level of concentration and entry barriers, become increasingly foreclosed after
the transaction, may have a “de facto” community relevance. However, that given
operation, provided that the merging companies achieve more than two-thirds of their
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one Member State, would lack a
“Community dimension”, and therefore would escape the scrutiny of the European
Commission.
119

Staff working paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council Report
on the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004, 30 June 2009.
120
Communication from the Commission to the Council “Report on the functioning of Regulation No
139/2004”, (June 2009) p.6.
121
Staff working paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council Report
on the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004, (30 June 2009) p 20.
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In this regard, the electricity industry is a good illustration of a market where
relevant geographic scope remains national122, triggering the jurisdiction of the national
competition authorities.123 One of the main reasons why the geographic scope of the
electricity markets remains national can be traced in the still poor level of cross-border
interconnection between Member States. Interestingly, this factor has been repeatedly
highlighted by the European Commission during the legislative process that has led to
the approval of the third energy package analyzed in previous sections.124 While the
European Commission has launched several initiatives in order to address the lack of
interconnection capacity between Member States125, it is not likely that in the short term
the geographical scope of these markets vary, evolving towards a wider dimension than
national.
Anyhow, regardless of the particular features that cause the electricity markets
scope to remain national, cases such as the merger operation between E.ON and
Ruhrgas that, by means of the Two Thirds Rule, was dealt by the German Competition
Authority in 2001, or the attempted take-over of Endesa by Gas Natural in 2005 -subject
to the Spanish merger control rules-, are examples of transactions in the energy sector
122

The activities related to the generation and wholesale supply of electricity are for the most part
national in their scope (see for instance, case No COMP/M.5171 - ENEL / ACCIONA / ENDESA). A
few exceptions (e.g. Scandinavian markets) exist though. Moreover, transmission and distribution, being
characterized as natural monopolies, usually have a regional scope.
123
This is in spite of the efforts that some public authorities, particularly the European Institutions, have
made in order to eliminate entry barriers and promote market integration. The Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Report on progress in creating the internal gas
and electricity market”, 7 (11 March 2009) refers to the disparities in prices for household consumers in
the Member States in the first half of 2008 as a clear sign of insufficient market integration.
124
Thus, for instance, congestions in the network as well as other sort of technical shortcomings (such as
lack of co-ordination between national energy networks operators in issues like congestion management)
prevent –or at least limit- new entrants from resorting to electricity imports as a tool for competing in
prices in the retail market. See Impact assessment accompanying the legislative package on the internal
market for electricity and gas (third package), 15(2007). See also MARTHA M. ROGGENKAMP,ULF
HAMMER, EUROPEAN ENERGY LAW REPORT II, 26 (2005).
125
Amongst others, the expected infrastructure increasing the interconnection between Spain and France.
Indeed, an agreement aimed at doubling the electric interconnection capacity between France and Spain
is going to be deployed pursuant to an agreement reached in 2008 and highly encouraged by the European
Commission. Further projects with regard to the energy interconnections are to be developed according
with the Trans-European energy networks (TEN-E) initiative launched by the European Commission.
See: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/tent_e/ten_e_en.htm
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with potential cross-border effects in the Community that have escaped to the analysis
of the European Commission.126 Indeed, merger operations with “community
relevance” (significant spillovers that do not always have to coincide with the size of the
transaction) might be out of the scope of competence of the European Commission if
the operation lacks of “Community dimension” –calculated according to the turnovers
reached by the merging companies-.127 In this respect, some authors have argued that, in
order to avoid distortions in the competition resulting from an inappropriate
enforcement of merger control rules by Member States, the determination of the
supervisory body that will scrutinize a merger operation should be defined by “the
absolute size of the spillovers” (that is to say, by the effects in the markets) rather than
by the turnovers reached in a given Member State.128
Not surprisingly, the European Commission has tried on several occasions to
increase its scope of competence by filing amendment proposals of the Merger
Regulation (including an attempt to drop turnovers thresholds and to add qualitative
criteria to the existing quantitative standards) leading to ensure its jurisdiction every
time that a transaction significantly affects competition.129 In a recently published
report, the European Commission, again, put forward a review of the Two Thirds Rule
as a result of the diverting interests taken into consideration by some national
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Staff working paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council Report
on the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004, 20 (30 June 2009).
127
Under those circumstances, decisions of the Member States on merger operations with cross-border
effects cannot be currently subject to EU review except for those cases where EU legislation is proved to
have been infringed; in such circumstances, even if an infringement procedure could be initiated by the
European Commission in order to challenge a concrete piece of national legislation, the decision over the
merger operation taken at a national level will not be directly reversed by the European Commission.
Moreover, even if a decision of a national regulatory or competition authority is finally challenged by the
European Court of Justice on the grounds of the violation of EU legislation, the time-consuming process
will most likely prevent this option from being an effective tool for the European Commission to review a
merger with cross-border effects.
128
D. Neven, R. Nuttall and P. Seabright, Merger in Daylight: the economics and Politics of European
Merger Control, 198 (1993).
129
See EDURNE NAVARRO ET AL., MERGER CONTROL IN THE EU, 68 (Oxford ed., 2d ed. 2005).
European Commission’s Green Papers on the review of EU merger control (1996 and 2001).
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competition authorities when analyzing merger operations that were subject to their
jurisdiction as a result of the mentioned rule.130
For the time being, in the absence of a clear political will to step in and promote a
change of the turnover thresholds and/or the Two Thirds Rule, the European
Commission’s scrutiny of mergers with community relevance (but not the Community
dimension that triggers exclusive jurisdiction of the European Commission) would only
be achieved by means of efficient referral mechanisms between the national and the
Community authorities.131 However, the current existing scheme provided by the
Regulation 139/2004132, in addition to being cumbersome in terms of the paper work
required133, does not ensure the allocation of cases to the European Commission.
Indeed, given that the decision of referring cases remains at the discretion of the
pertinent Member States, chances for the European Commission to be left out of the
analysis of operations with significant cross-border effects but without “Community
dimension” remain high.134 In practice, as a result of the Two Thirds Rule and the
130

Communication from the Commission to the Council, Report on the functioning of Regulation No
139/2004, 5 (2009).
131
Staff working paper accompanying Communication from the Commission to the Council Report on
the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004, p. 66.
132
Article 4.5 of the Regulation 139/2004, related to the prenotification referral, foresees that an operation
which does not have a Community dimension, but is capable of being reviewed under the national
competition laws of at least three Member States, might be subject to the scrutiny of the European
Commission provided that:
• The filing company, before any notification to the competent authorities, informs the Commission
that the concentration should be examined by the European Commission.
• After transmission of the request to all Member States, no Member State competent to examine the
concentration under its national competition law expresses its disagreement as regards the request to
refer the case within 15 working days of receiving the reasoned submission.
A similar procedure to request a referral once the notification has already been filed to one or several
Member States has also been set by means of Article by article 22 of Regulation 139/2004. This “Dutch
clause” (its name stemming from the need of Member States that at the time of being passed the
legislation lacked from Merger Regulation), allows Member States to refer to the European Commission
the analysis of transactions that do not have a Community dimension but affects trade between Member
States and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States
making the request.
133
ROGER J. VAN DEN BERGH AND PETER D CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 428 (Thompson ed., 2006).
134
Even if the cooperation between national and EU competition authorities has significantly increased
over the last years, such collaboration has been developed more noticeably in the field of antitrust rather
than in the merger control area. See “Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on
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particular features of the electricity markets, a vast majority of mergers operations
within the electricity sector has been subject to the analysis of the national competitions
authorities.135
In addition to the jurisdictional issue, the European Commission has shown its
concern about the narrow national-based approach that Member States have undertaken
in some cases when analyzing merger operations in the electricity sector.136 Indeed, the
analysis of mergers such as the two transactions pointed out before (E.ON/Ruhrgas and
Endesa/Gas Natural) lacked from a purely competition-based approach. In the operation
analyzed by the German Bundeskartellant as well as in the attempted take-over of
Endesa (first electricity incumbent in Spain in the generation, distribution and supply
markets) by Gas Natural (leader in the whole chain of the gas business) subject to the
scrutiny of the Spanish merger control rules, the competition authorities decided to
prohibit the operations disregarding the remedies proposed by the merging companies.
In the German case, where E.ON –major electricity operator- was to acquire Ruhrgas the largest German grid gas company- the Bundeskartellamt considered that “the

competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”. Under its chapter IV, the Regulation foresees
the application of the “Community competition rules in close cooperation between the European
Commission and the national competition authorities”. For more information on the cooperation between
National Competition Authorities, see “Co-operation between National Competition Agencies in the
Enforcement of EC Competition Law” Silke Brammer (Hart Publishing, June 2009).
135
For a review of the transactions undertaken in the electricity field, see Arndt Christiansen, Regulation
and EU merger Control in the liberalized electricity sector, (2005). See also “Mergers and acquisitions in
the European electricity sector- cases and patterns”, Cerna, (July 2003).
In the same context, see “Competitive Policy and Merger Analysis in Deregulated and Newly
Competitive Industries: Mergers in deregulated or newly competitive industries in the European Unionenergy, financial services and airline transportation” Susan Beth Farmer (SSRN, 2008).
136
The staff working paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council
Report on the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004, 30 June 2009, points out that “public interest
considerations other than competition policy have been applied in a number of cases falling under this
threshold to authorise mergers which could have given rise to competition concerns”. Notwithstanding
this, the potential bias in the Member State’s outcome about a merger frequently arises as a result of a
decision taken at a political level, and not necessarily by the competition agency. In this respect, it is
necessary and fair to recognize the important role played by the national competition authorities when
scrutinizing merger operations as well as, in general terms, their work in the development of a “culture of
competition” in the Member States.
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merger would have strengthened dominant positions both in the gas and electricity
sales markets”. 137 Particularly, the president of the Competition Authority stated that
“the combination of E.ON and Ruhrgas in a time of emerging liberalization in the
gas markets would cement Ruhrgas’ dominant position. This would considerably
diminish the likelihood of any effective competition from other grid gas companies.
There was also the danger of E.ON’s market position in the electricity sector being
further strengthened to the detriment of small competitors and consequently
consumers.”
Likewise, the former Spanish “Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia” did not
give the green light to the acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural, based on similar
grounds.138 Notwithstanding this, both the German and Spanish government in office at
the time when these operations took place eventually decided to authorize the mergers
on the basis of the strategic significance of the prospective national energy companies
resulting from those transactions.139
Although the study of the rights and wrongs of the trend followed by some
Member States promoting the so-called energy “national champions” goes beyond the
scope of this paper, it is to be noted that the European Commission has taken action to
try to avoid conducts of Member States that might compromise the consecution of the
Internal Market.140 As later stated by the former Commissioner for competition, the
137

See Bundeskartellamt decisión:
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/ArchivNews2002/2002_01_21.php
For a further analysis of this decision and its consequences, see Ines Zenke, Becker Büttner Held, “The
merger of E.ON and Ruhrgas: A never-ending story?”, Volume I, issue 01, (OGEL, January 2003).
138
See Dictamen del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia on this case (January 2006).
139
See François Lévêque “Antitrust Enforcement in the electricity and gas Industries: Problems and
Solutions for the EU”, Cerna (2005/6), arguing about the need of eliminating the “Two Thirds Rule” as a
result of its unsuitability to the energy sector and possible negative consequences that decisions as the
ones occurred in the E.ON/Ruhrgas and Gas Natural/Endesa cases might have for the consecution of the
EU competition and energy policies.
140
In the case of the foregoing failed transaction between Endesa and Gas Natural, short time after the
merger was approved by the Spanish government, an attempted counter-bid launched by the German
energy giant E.ON for Endesa was subject to certain conditions imposed by the Spanish Energy Regulator
(CNE). This time, given that the merger had a Community dimension due to the geographic distribution
of E.ON’s turnover, the European Commission asserted its sole jurisdiction over the transaction.
Accordingly, it declared that the conditions imposed by Spain were in violation of article 21 of the
Merger Regulation 139/2004, constituted unjustified restrictions to the merger and therefore were
incompatible with Community law. This decision of the European Commission was subsequently uphold
by the European Court of Justice. Case C-196/07, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 6 March
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European Commission has had to legally deter Member States from “preventing cross
border mergers on unjustified grounds favoring national champions to the detriment of
internal market principles”.141
As a matter of fact, the most common patterns in promoting energy national
champions by Member States have consisted of, first, giving thumbs up when national
companies were seeking approval to create a national energy giant –in spite of the
possible consequences that the operation might entail in terms of limiting the number of
competitors in both overlapping markets and markets in which any of the merging
companies might have become in the mid-term a possible competitor-; and, second, by
deterring foreign companies from entering the national market through takeovers of
relevant national entities –even if the operation could bring clear efficiencies and
benefits for the consumers-. Whether such “protectionist” conducts arise as a result of
the initial unwillingness of some Member States to liberalize the energy markets142 or
just owing to economic (but more plausibly strategic) reasons, remains an issue to be
discussed separately though.143 In any case, the European Commission recognized, as
2008— Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Spain
In this respect, it should be noted that article 21 of Regulation 139/2004 provides that the European
Commission will have exclusive jurisdiction over takeovers with Community dimension and,
accordingly, “[n]o Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition to any concentration
that has a Community dimension”. However, that provision also adds that “[m]ember States may take
appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this
Regulation and compatible with the general principles and other provisions of Community law.”
Accordingly “[p]ublic security, plurality of the media and prudential rules” have been set in the
Regulation as legitimate interests. Conversely “[a]ny other public interest must be communicated to the
Commission by the Member State concerned and shall be recognised by the Commission after an
assessment of its compatibility with the general principles and other provisions of Community law before
the measures referred to above may be taken.”
141
Neelie Kroes -former European Commissioner for Competition Policy-, Developments in competition
policy Meeting with the European Economic and Social Committee, Internal Market Section Brussels (9
September 2009).
142
See infringement procedures instituted against numerous Member States for lack or inadequate
implementation of the electricity and gas Directives.
143
In this respect, see Remarks of Deborah Platt Majoras, U.S. Federal Trade Commission Chairman on
“National Champions: I Don’t Even Think it Sounds Good” at the International Competition
Conference/EU Competition Day (Munich, March 26, 2007), refuting the suitability of the promotion of
“national champions” for the sake of industry development and general interest of consumers.
Likewise, see Speech of the Neelie Kroes on “Cross-border mergers and energy markets”, Cernobbia,
Italy (2 September 2006).
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the president of the Bunderskartellamt did, the threats that, in terms of undesirable
effects for European competition, might involve merger operations between large
national energy companies in markets still under an ongoing process of liberalization or
where “barriers between member states are being progressively eliminated”.144 Thus,
while the consolidation of strong market position by former monopolies may lead to the
replication of ills of the past, the promotion of high levels of concentration through
merger operations paves the way for exercising market power in the electricity field,
constituting entry barriers and hampering the consecution of liberalization and EU
integration goals. Indeed, precisely when the geographic scope of such markets
“should” evolve towards a European-wide dimension, the high level of concentration
might be pulling the triggers to counteract that tendency.145
Thus, in cases where cross-border effects are likely to arise, it appears that the
European Commission would be placed in a better (or at least more impartial) situation
for carrying out the related investigation and pursuing the merger analysis in order to
ensure that the Internal Market is not jeopardized. The issue at stake is not that noncompetition concerns (e.g. security of supply) should be barred from the analysis of a
competition authority analyzing a merger operation, but just that, if some other
variables should enter the equation of the merger control enforcement, the European
Commission will probably adopt a less dogmatic position than the approach undertaken
by Member States.

144

See Staff working paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council
Report on the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004, point 69 (30 June 2009).
145
Id. at point 65.
The concerns showed by the European Commission related to the application of the Two Thirds Rule
have been even shared by some stakeholders, as pointed out by the European Commission in its recently
published Report on the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004. Some market players highlight that the
European Commission is in a better position to assess certain mergers which might increase the
foreclosure of specific energy markets. They hence point out the risk of a biased application of national
merger control rules when analyzing transactions of strategic importance for the Country concerned.
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Having explored some of the detrimental effects of the Two Thirds Rule, one
might certainly cast doubts about the convenience of maintaining a rule that deprives
the best positioned actor from evaluating the appropriateness of cross-border operations.
Indeed, in spite of the unquestionable job made by national competition authorities
promoting competition in the electricity markets, letting Member States rule about
certain energy-related mergers and corporate acquisitions where national companies are
involved has become the same as appointing Spanish referees should Spain played the
final of the FIFA World Cup 2010. In this respect, the European Commission has
highlighted in several occasions that it would be advisable to guarantee the “protection
of undistorted competition” regardless the authority that undertakes the merger
analysis.146 However, the actual facts and outcomes emerging in the framework of some
merger-related decisions –coming from all latitudes of the European Union- show that
the European Commission’s expectations are not always met.
Against this backdrop, several alternatives might be undertaken in order to avoid
unwilling consequences in terms of competition. In this respect, the elimination of the
Two Thirds Rule, at least when it comes to its application to the energy sector, appears
to gain some weight147, as this rule is being considered a significant factor for the
consolidation of the national champions trend. In fact, it may be hampering one of the
main goals of the EU Energy policy, namely, the integration of the electricity and gas
markets. As it has been previously pointed out, the Commission itself has called to a
debate on this possibility. However, although this path might be an option, other
alternatives –some of them perhaps more balanced-, should be reviewed.
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The staff working paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council
Report on the functioning of Regulation No 139/2004, Point 82(30 June 2009).
147
See amongst others François Leveque, “Antitrust enforcement in the electricity and gas industries:
problems and solutions for the EU” (Cerna, 2006).
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First, at least theoretically, a different scheme to address the allocation of cases
between the European Commission and the national competition authorities could pass
by, precisely, not allocating cases. That is to say, applying a system akin to the US
approach when it comes to the distribution of powers in merger control. According to
that system, rather than a threshold that determines whether a concentration shall be
analyzed under one or another regulatory body at the federal or state level, transactions
of a minimum size have to be notified to the U.S. federal antitrust agencies, the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, as well as to the
corresponding state competition and regulatory authorities. Under this approach, any of
these authorities may, if considered necessary, challenge an operation regardless of the
fact that other competition agency (even one of broader scope) may have previously
cleared the merger. While implementing such a system at the European level would
obviously have the virtue of ensuring that the operation is subject to all levels of
scrutiny, it would be in exchange for significant amounts of time and money spent at the
expense of taxpayers and private market players. Additionally, this option would most
likely clash with many Member States’ standpoints as well as with the perspective of
the European Commission itself on the one-stop-shop review system.148
At present, apart from the system of voluntary referral previously mentioned, the
European Commission holds exclusive jurisdiction to analyze mergers with a
Community dimension. This system avoids parallel jurisdictions, bringing cost-savings
and consistency in the decisions.
Furthermore, while assuring the European Commission jurisdiction over mergers
with cross-border effects, a multijurisdictional overview of merger operations would not
148

Indeed, from the very beginning EU merger control supported the idea of one-stop-shop in the
transactions with Community dimension, avoiding parallel jurisdictional disputes. See Van den Bergh and
CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, 427 (Thomson, 2006).
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bar Member States from blocking operations that might be beneficial (or at least not
harmful) for the achievement of the European integration and liberalization. For all
these reasons, the implementation of this option at the EU level should be clearly
dismissed.
Second, greater chances of “appropriate” application of competition rules could be
achieved should the national authorities responsible for the control of mergers and
acquisitions were given real independence from their corresponding national
governments. Such an option at least would contribute to ensure alike application of
merger control across the EU. Nevertheless, this option would still not attribute to the
European Commission competence over all mergers with cross-border effects.
Moreover, in spite of the fact that the independency of administrative bodies is a
commendable objective sought by the European Union149, its implementation would
necessarily entail thorough amendments of the different national procedures set for the
analysis, and potential clearance, of merger operations.
Thus, for this alternative to effectively mitigate undesirable bias, it would be
necessary that the Member States would commit to guarantee not only that both national
competition agencies and sector-related regulators taking part in the supervision of
merger operations in the electricity sector are effectively independent150, but also that
the whole procedure of analysis in every single Member State does not give room for
political discretion. And, in this regard, even the countries with the longest tradition in
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As it has been mentioned before in this paper, the European Commission has stressed the need for an
equal enforcement of competition standards EU-wide. When it comes to the role of National Regulatory
Authorities, see chapter IX of the Directive 2009/72, related to, amongst other aspects, the required level
of independence of these administrative bodies.
150
In the abovementioned cases regarding Gas Natural/Endesa, when E.ON bid for Endesa, the National
Regulatory Authority (CNE) was the administrative body which introduced the conditions that eventually
led the German company to withdraw its offer. The final reversal by the European Court of Justice –one
year later- of the Spanish legislation that enabled the CNE to impose those conditions obviously did not
bring a relief to E.ON.
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the application of merger control enforcement (as it might be the case of Germany in the
European Union landscape), preserve in their legislation the option for a “political” final
say about a transaction.151
Finally, an alternative that would indirectly grant the European Commission a
control over mergers with potential cross border effects might have been hinted by the
former commissioner for competition Neelie Kroes when she affirmed that a
modification of the current EU merger rules could be necessary in order to ensure “that
merger cases get the same strict investigation everywhere, be it at national or European
level”.152 Thus, the variation from the current system would mainly involve a sort of
European Commission’s power of review over the decisions taken by the national
competition authorities on mergers, at least those potentially leading to cross-border
anticompetitive effects.
In this regard, in order to minimize the undesirable uncertainties derived from an
outright overview of national decisions over mergers,153 this alternative would consist
of keeping the current Two Thirds Rule as a matter of initial approach in the allocation
151

Indeed, though rarely used, the German executive power holds the competence to overrule the
decisions taken by its national competition authority on the grounds of policy reasons, as it was the case
in its decision of 5 July 2002 granting ministerial authorization to the E.ON/Ruhrgas transaction. At that
occasion the reason underlying such a ministerial resolution was that “Ruhrgas’ international
competitiveness would be strengthened on the procurement side. According to the Ministry, the long-term
purchase of inexpensive natural gas, particularly from Russia, will improve the security of supply in
Germany.” See Bundeskartellamt report 2001- 2002, pg 13.
Any imposition of modifications on these areas by the European Commission (removing unreasonable
discretionary power by politicians in the context of merger transactions), would be probably beyond the
powers of the European Union.
152
Speech Neelie Kroes, former European Commissioner DG Competition, What’s Wrong with Europe’s
Energy Markets?, Vienna, (1 March 2006).
153
It is without a doubt that non-negligible difficulties would arise in order to define in a reasonable and
legally certain way the takeovers fulfilling the characteristics in order to be overseen by the European
Commission. Some of the standards to be used for clearly determining the outreach of the Commission’s
power might go beyond the short-term potential cross-border effects of the transaction and, conversely,
focus on the long-term consequences of the transaction for the achievement of the internal market. These
consequences can actually stem from the exacerbation of some characteristics of the electricity market
structures (particularly the foreclosure of the markets).
However, it seems doubtful that Member States would accept a legislative action to ensure European
Commission’s jurisdiction over mergers EU-wide if that option implies a direct interference in the day-today work of the national competition authorities.
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of jurisdiction, focusing subsequently solely on those operations which have benefited
from that exception and, hence, “escape” the European Commission scrutiny. Based on
the European Commission statistics154, in the period comprised between 2001 and 2008,
126 cases fell under the Two-Thirds Rule. However, only a 10% of these cases were
related to the energy sector. Accordingly, the power of the European Commission for
intervening –and potentially claim jurisdiction over a merger- would be limited to a
restricted number of transactions. The European Commission intervention should in any
event take place before the national competition authority initiates its review of the case
in order to avoid the costs, in economic and time-consuming terms, stemming from a
potential reversal of a national competition authority decision by the European
Commission.
In this respect, according to the European Commission, the Two Third Rule only
fails in few cases to distinguish between “concentrations that, in terms of their crossborder effects, have a Community relevance and those that do not”.155 If this appraisal
is correct, the intervention –and subsequent need for the European Commission to
demonstrate spillovers of a given merger- would be reduced to a small number of
transactions and the interference with the functioning of national competition authorities
would be mitigated.
b. Shifting on the substantive test and results
As a result of the previous debate on the suitability of allocating the supervision of
certain cross-border transactions to the national competition authorities, one might
conclude that every time that the European Commission takes the lead and oversees a
takeover with Community dimension, “strict” merger control will take place.
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Communication from the Commission to the Council: Report on the functioning of Regulation No
139/2004, European Commission, June 18 2009.
155
Id.
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Nevertheless, that has not been always the case. As already advanced in previous
sections, the potential concerns when analyzing mergers in the electricity markets are
not confined to the identity of the agency exercising the competitive analysis of the
operation -and particularly whether the European Commission will have jurisdiction
over a merger which displays its effects beyond the boundaries of a certain Member
State-. Conversely, one additional key factor that will define the reliability of the
competition analysis revolves around the aspects to be taken into consideration in order
to gauge the potential anticompetitive effects of the operation –factors that, eventually,
will lead the competition authority to clear, prohibit or authorize a merger subject to
certain conditions-.156
Likewise, the effectiveness in the detection of potential competition concerns
stemming from a merger does not necessarily rely either on the amount, or percentage,
of transactions banned by the competition authorities. In this field, more than in any
other, quality should prevail over quantity.157
In order to get around these and other possible flaws, a major turn on the EU
merger legislation took place in 2004, by means of the approval of the new regulation
139/2004, complemented by specific guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers
as well as through later guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal
concentrations.158 Whether this new piece of legislation involved a real shift in the
156

Thus, even if a given competition authority might look stricter in the application of its control over
merger operations by blocking a higher number of proposed concentrations, it could occur that
anticompetitive operations would be getting approved; conversely, fairly pro-competitive transactions
could be blocked
157
In this context, and from a quantitative perspective, the European Commission has undertaken the
review of more than 130 mergers in the electricity sector (or involving traditionally electricity-based
companies) during the period comprised between the mid 1990s and 2004. Only one of them has been
eventually prohibited at the end of the two-phase review process (M.3440 - ENI / EDP / GDP (2004)). On
the contrary, in a large number of cases, the takeover was approved subject to different kind of conditions
–remedies- aimed at rendering the transaction compatible with the European Common Market. Indeed,
arts. 6.2 and 8.2 of Regulation 139/2004 provide that the European Commission may decide, “following
modification by the undertakings concerned”, in Phase I or II, that a concentration no longer raise any
doubts about its compatibility with the common market.
158
See 2004/C 31/03, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation
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European Commission approach to merger control, or was simply a “matter of
continuity rather than discontinuity”159, has been a subject of extended discussion;
however, it cannot be contested that the new substantive test (essentially based on
whether the merger will “significantly impede effective competition”), meant a

consolidation in the evolution towards a more effects-based approach in the analysis of
merger operations.
This advancement, at least theoretically, would limit the traditional structural
analysis of mergers based on the market shares of the intervening companies to a mere
additional criteria. Indeed, even if a high market share remains a significant factor in the
analysis, it would not categorically entail the existence of anticompetitive effects and,
more importantly, its absence would not automatically preclude further examination.
Thus, the decision to undertake an in-depth second phase160 investigation should be
made not only upon data related to market shares or market concentration, but based on
the odds for the merger to significantly impede effective competition. For that purpose,
the DG Competition will carry out an analysis of the competitive conditions before and
after the transaction, taking into consideration, where necessary, factors that might
diminish the post-merger level of competition such as –but not limited to- strength and
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJEU 5.2.2004); and 2008/C 265/07, Guidelines
on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
concentrations between undertakings (OJEU 18.10.2008).
As a result of different setbacks detected by the European Commission (published in a Commission's
Merger Remedy Study (2005)) in the application of some remedies approved within the framework of
merger operations subject to the EU merger control (and more particularly in the divestiture of
businesses), the Commission adopted a Remedies Notice in 2008 in which addresses specific
requirements of the divesting approach, focusing on aspects such as the scope of the business , the profile
of the buyers and the actual performance of the remedies agreed.
159
It is noteworthy that Recital 25 of the Regulation 139/ 2004 points out that the EU merger control
approach does not imply a complete rebuttal of the dominance test.
160
In this regard, it is to be noted that the review of merger operations by the European Commission is
basically divided into two main phases. According to the current Regulation 139/2004, the first phase –
commencing with the notification of the operation by the parties- will consist of a period of twenty five
working days at the end of which the Commission will have to decide whether the transaction causes
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market; when that it is not the case (or the
Commission just considers that the operation does not fall under its jurisdiction), the transaction will be
cleared. Otherwise, the review will pass to a Phase II –90 working days subject to extensions-, where an
in-depth investigation of the operation is undertaken. A further description of factors that make the
European Commission opting to proceed to a second Phase are further developed in following sections.
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number of competitors, existence of capacity constraints, close substitutability of
merging firms products or the likelihood that other companies enter the market.161
In that sense, it is noticeable how the EU approach to mergers -further developed
in the guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers- highly converges with the
FTC/DOJ perspective in the assessment of these transactions.162 Indeed, the European
rules on merger control also warn against a mechanical application of the different steps
set in the EU Guidelines, calling instead for a competitive analysis “based on an overall
assessment of the foreseeable impact of the merger in the light of the relevant factors
and conditions. Not all the elements will always be relevant to each and every
horizontal merger, and it may not be necessary to analyse all the elements of a case in
the same detail”.163
In the framework of the electric industry, and particularly within the context of the
proposed acquisition of joint control over Hidrocantábrico by EDP, EnBW and
Cajastur164, in spite of the relatively limited market shares –not superior to 10-15%161

See Guidelines on Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, point 17.
On an American approach to the importance of potential competition in assessing the effects of a merger as well as in the context of antitrust cases- see Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential
Competition Doctrine, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1035 (2004)
162
In this context, the power to conduct inspections laid down in the merger Regulation stands out as an
important tool provided to the European Commission. Particularly, the ability to require different types of
documents to the merging companies resembles, to a certain extent, the DOJ civil investigative demand
authority to compel information from third parties. The powers provided in art. 13 of Regulation
139/2004 authorizes the European Commission, for instance, to conduct inspections across the facilities
of the merging companies, examining the books and other business-related data, interrogating employees
of the companies. Fines for intentionally or negligently supplying misleading information within the
course of the investigation are equally foreseen by the Regulation 139/2004 (article 14).
These approaches differ from the position of FERC in the analysis of mergers, which, in general terms,
lacks of investigative tools. As previously advanced, some authors have stated that such inexistent–or
limited- ability to obtain sensitive competitive information cannot be considered the reason behind the
FERC’s approach to the merger review, which would be based on a particular conception of the market
power in electricity markets. See, “Electricity merger analysis: market screen, market definition and
other lemmings”, Darren Bush p.284 (Review of Industrial Organization, 2008).
163
See Guidelines on Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, point 13.
Likewise, the EU Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers approved by the European
Commission in 2008 establish that the different HHI thresholds proposed within that document cannot be
taken as a legal presumption on the existence of competition concerns but just as preliminary indicators.
Indeed, they specifically remind that “the existence of a significant degree of market power in at least one
of the markets concerned is a necessary condition for competitive harm, but is not a sufficient condition.”
Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, point 27.
164
European Commission case M.2684 - EnBW / EDP / Cajastur / Hidrocantabrico (2002).
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held by the merging parties in each of the two relevant markets concerned in this case
(namely, electricity sold through the wholesale market and retail market), the European
Commission decided that the transaction should be “assessed in the light of the high
degree of concentration on the Spanish electricity market and of its isolation due to a
shortage of interconnections with other systems”.165 In this case, the concerns of the
European Commission rose from the fact that EdF held joint control over one of the
buyers in the operation (EnBW). As a result of the proposed merger, the European
Commission feared that EdF, absolute dominant player in the generation, transmission,
distribution and trading of electricity in France, lacked of incentives to increase the
interconnection capacity between France and the Iberian Peninsula, perpetuating one of
the most relevant entry barriers to the highly concentrated Spanish market.166
It is noteworthy that the analysis of this case took place under the former EU
merger regulation, sustained in the test of dominance. However, it has been broadly
expected that, in general terms, the move from the test of dominance to the SIEC test
would result in a more efficient control. Indeed, under the test applied prior to 2004, the
dominance was the factor to be proven in order to challenge the operation. It did not
necessarily imply that only market shares angles would be observed, but if the merger led
to relevant concentration levels the operation had significant chances to be challenged
165

Id. at point 29.
The definition of the relevant product markets was initially settled in the electricity market by
differentiating between the generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities. When it comes to
this last field, the European Commission has considered, and finally accepted according to the degree of
liberalization achieved in each EU Member State, the segregation between wholesale and retail activities.
Thus, the European Commission decisions in cases such as EDF/ Louis Dreyfus (M.1557 -1999); Grupo
Villar Mir/ EnBW/ Hidroelectrica del Cantabrico (M.2434 - 2001); or the above mentioned EnBW/ EDP/
Cajastur / Hidrocantabrico, show how the definition of the relevant product markets (and particularly the
ones related to supply activities) will vary according to the existing degree of liberalization. In that sense,
in the projected acquisition of Hidroelectrica del Cantabrico by Grupo Villar Mir and EnBW taking place
in Spain, the distinction between “the electricity offered through the wholesale market (the pool and
bilateral contracts between eligible customers [-those which are free to choose among suppliers-] and
generators) and the electricity offered subsequently by traders to eligible customers (retail market)” was
made.
When it comes to the geographic scope, different factors and particularly the physical constraints (lack of
cross boundary transmission capacity) and regulatory divergences between the EU countries lead to the
definition (except in few exceptions mentioned before –e.g. Scandinavian markets-) of relevant
geographical markets at a national level.
166
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(involving in some cases a clear risk of over-enforcement - false positives-). Likewise, false
negatives (or under-enforcement) were more likely to occur under the dominance test. In
this respect, the SIEC test should be useful in order to avoid overlooking some operations

that, subject to the preceding test, would have probably received approval of the
European Commission.167
Thus, the “new” test approaches the horizontal mergers by clearly distinguishing
between coordinated and non-coordinated effects which might stem from mergers.
Indeed, the amendment of the substantive test sought to close enforcement gaps existing
under the previous dominance test approach. 168
On the front of non-coordinated effects, the SIEC test allows tackling oligopolistic
situations where the resulting merged company unilaterally enjoys substantial market
power but does not become the largest firm in the market.169 When horizontal mergers
are under the spotlight, factors such as the market shares held by the merging
companies, the pre-merger competitive relationship between those undertakings, the
elimination of an important competitive force in the market or the limited chances for
customers to switch to another supplier, could, according to the Guideline on horizontal
mergers, result in significant non-coordinated effects that might eventually lead the
European Commission to challenge the operation (particularly when a combination of
that factors occurs).
Other than the risks for competition stemming from unilateral behaviors –
concerning either dominant firms or members of an oligopolistic market-, coordinated
effects resulting from horizontal mergers are also subject to the European Commission’s
167

See MARTHA M. ROGGENKAMP,ULF HAMMER, EUROPEAN ENERGY LAW REPORT II
(2005).
168
This point makes the difference with the previous approach, whereby mergers which did not create or
strengthen a dominant position could not be challenged by the European Commission.
See also note 75.
169
See Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), point 24.
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scrutiny. More particularly, the guidelines refer to “tacit collusion”170 between the
merging companies and the remaining competitors in the market. Indeed, the European
Commission asserts that particularly in highly concentrated markets -as it is the case in
the majority of segments of the electric power industry across the European Unionmergers might, under certain circumstances, significantly impede effective competition,
given that they might increase
“the likelihood that firms are able to coordinate their behaviour in this way and
raise prices, even without entering into an agreement or resorting to a concerted
practice within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty. A merger may also make
coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms, that were already
coordinating before the merger, either by making the coordination more robust or by
permitting firms to coordinate on even higher prices.”171
Vertical and conglomerate mergers were similarly addressed, distinguishing
between coordinated and non–coordinated effects. Non-coordinated effects were
particularly feared as they may result in the foreclosure of the markets to third parties.172

170

Tacit collusion between companies, which may result in coordination related to prices, volume of
output or geographic allocation of markets, would differ from the more obviously reprehensible collusive
agreements, subject to the prohibition of the former article 81 of the EC Treaty.
See Frank Maier-Rigaud and Kay Parplies, EU Merger Control Five Years After The Introduction Of The
SIEC Test: What Explains the Drop in Enforcement Activity?” (European Commission Lwa Review,
2009).
171
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, 39 (2004/C 31/03).
It is to be noted that, in order to consider tacit collusion to be a real risk for competition, the European
Commission requires the fulfillment of three conditions. These conditions match the requirements
previously pointed out by the European Court of First Instance in its first judgment overruling the
European Commission on a merger prohibition Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission. Thus, the
companies involved in a tacit collusion must be able to monitor the compliance by the other participants
with the terms of the coordination; a mechanism of deterrence must be available to be applied to those
companies which deviates from the coordinated trend; and the results derived from the coordination
should not be jeopardized by other competitors or customers not participating in the coordination.
The inclusion of this coordinated effects theory within the guidelines confirms the convergence of the EU
and US approaches to “coordinated effects” in the context of horizontal mergers.
172
In order to appraise actual non-coordinated effects, three steps in the scrutiny of the merger are
required by the European Commission’s guidelines (analysis of post merger ability to substantially
foreclose access to inputs; incentive to incur in such a foreclosure conduct; and overall likely impact on
effective competition, particularly materialized through significant prejudicial impact on competition
downstream or upstream stemmed from the merger operation). See section 47 of the Guidelines on the
assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations
between undertakings (OJEU 18.10.2008).
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The relevance of coordinated and non-coordinated effects stemmed from vertical
merger operations can be illustrated by the European Commission decision on the
acquisition of British Energy by EDF173, analyzed under the new EU merger
Regulation. In this respect, vertical mergers within the electricity markets are to be
analyzed under a different angle with regard to their potential effects on competition.
Indeed, contrary to the broad-shared opinion that non-horizontal mergers are “less likely
to significantly impede effective competition than horizontal mergers”174, vertical
mergers in the electricity sector can result in particularly harmful consequences.
As the European Commission reminds in the British Energy/ EDF case, the
conclusions of the sector inquiry driven in the energy market already warned against
mergers that increase the level of vertical integration of the merged entity, as they:

“can potentially lead to a decrease of the merged entity’s need to trade with other
counterparties in the wholesale markets since part of its power needs might, postmerger, be covered by the merged entity’s own power generation. If this happens, it is
possible that liquidity in the wholesale markets is reduced. The market investigation is
not conclusive as to whether, in general, there is a direct link between an increase of
vertical integration and a decrease in liquidity. However, the market investigation has
expressed serious concerns that this particular transaction may in fact have such
negative effects on liquidity.”175
This concern about vertical mergers must be particularly framed within the
context of the new energy package approved by the European Union, and particularly
regarding the unbundling alternatives set in the new directive 2009/72. In fact, should
the concerns expressed by the European Commission176 about the effectiveness of
unbundling options –particularly those not entailing ownership separation- prove to be
confirmed (ISO or ITO alternatives resulting in unsuccessful levels of unbundling), the
control of vertical mergers will have a more significant role in the completion of the EU
173

Case No COMP/M.5224 - EDF / British Energy
See Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement: Roundtable on the standard for merger
review, with a particular emphasis on country experience with the change of merger review standard from
the dominance test to the SLC/SIEC test (OECD, 2009).
175
Case No COMP/M.5224 - EDF / British Energy, point 40.
176
Speech Neelie Kroes, More competition and greater energy security in the Single European Market or
electricity and gas (Berlin, 30 March 2007).
174
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energy objectives.177
Vertical and conglomerate effects concerns were already raised during the merger
analysis that led to the prohibition of the acquisition of GDP by EDP and ENI.178 Being
the gas an important input in the generation of electricity, the European Commission
deemed that the merger between the dominant gas and electricity operators in Portugal
would give rise to foreclosure effects both on the gas and electricity markets.179
c. Incorporation of efficiency-based considerations to the EU Merger
review and remedies applied in the electricity sector
Efficiency considerations in the merger review, incorporated to the European
Commission analysis by EU Regulation 139/2004, deserve a specific treatment. Indeed,
while the risk of “false negatives” resulting from an excessive reliance on market share
and concentration considerations has been repeatedly highlighted in previous sections,
the introduction of efficiency defenses in the merger review might prevent false
positives. That is to say, avoid erroneous merger prohibitions or imposition of
unnecessary burdensome conditions. Unlike a majority of merger review systems
existing in other jurisdictions180, the EU approach to mergers for years did not take into
consideration efficiencies as a mean to counteract possible anticompetitive impacts of
the transaction. Contrarily, according to the former merger regulation, efficiency gains

177

Indeed, mergers leading to the vertical integration of electricity generation, supply and transmission
activities might drive, in the absence of effective unbundling, discriminatory treatment in the access to
transmission facilities and, therefore, the foreclosure of the markets and failure to achieve the energy
integration market objective.
178
Case No COMP/M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP, decision of December 9, 2004.
179
Likewise, the conglomerate mergers as defined by the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal
mergers can imply anticompetitive horizontal effects. This is the case, for instance, when a gas supplier
and an electricity generator decide to merge, removing a potential competitor on the gas and electricity
markets.
See, for instance Case COMP/M 493 Tractabel/Distriaz and COMP/M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP
180
The US approach to merger review foresees the use of efficiencies during the analysis of a transaction,
but also other jurisdictions legislations such as the Canadian Competition Act (sub-section 96 (1), or the
UK Enterprise Act 2002 take into consideration efficiencies that might result in customer benefits and,
therefore, would offset potential adverse effects to competition. For an economical analysis of the new
approach to efficiencies in the EU, see Fabienne Ilzkovitz and Roderick Meiklejohn , European Control:
do we need an efficiency defense? (Publications Office of the European Commission, 2006).
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were traditionally considered as anti-competitive signal for the competition authority
reviewing the operation.181
The merger Regulation 139/2004 introduced, and the horizontal guidelines further
developed, the notion of efficiency as a factor to be weighed by the European
Commission in order to assess the overall competitive impact of a concentration.
Similarly to the DOJ practice in this same field of merger defenses, the European
Commission, in order to consider efficiencies as a suitable counteracting factor
susceptible to offset the adverse competitive effects, will require that the alleged
efficiency gains fulfill specific criteria. Specifically, efficiencies are required to pass on
to consumers –benefiting them by means of lower prices and/or enhanced products
offered by the merged company-, do not result in the reduction of output182, derive from
the transaction -merger-specific- and be sufficiently verifiable.183
The appraisal of efficiencies by the European Commission is subject to similar
requirements when it comes to vertical and conglomerate mergers. Nonetheless, the EU
guidelines on non-horizontal mergers184 expressly acknowledge that this kind of vertical
and conglomerate integration is more likely to lead to substantial pro-competitive
efficiencies.185 While this is indeed a common argument contended by merging
companies operating in the electric industry, the existence of clear efficiencies

181

The European Commission, prior to the enactment of the new Merger Regulation, had frequently
considered efficiencies (such as the consecution of economies of scale by means of the merger) as signals
of dominance existence instead of factors contributing to counteract competitive harms stemming from
the transaction. See, for instance case M.2220- GE/Honeywell (merger approved, subject to certain
conditions in the form of divestitures, by the US DOJ, but prohibited by the European Commission).
182
As it is well established, reduction of costs driven by cuts in production does not bring gains for
consumers in the long run.
183
Supra. note 170 at point 76.
184
Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control
of concentrations between undertakings (2008).
185
For instance, the Guidelines on non-horizontal mergers refer to the “internalization of double markups” frequently occurring in vertical mergers. Roughly speaking, the merging firm will have incentives to
decrease prices in the downstream market given the fact that the increase in demand that this move entails
will also benefit the upstream market –costs cuts, etc.-. See point 13 and 47 of the guidelines.
64

Electricity merger control in the light of the EU “Third energy package”

stemming from vertical mergers186 should be however confronted to some of the
concerns raised by the European Commission in the inquiry conducted in the energy
sector. Thus, a high level of vertical integration (in principle limited by the unbundling
requirements as for the transmission activity, but not restricted when it comes to
generation and supply activities) can result in poor levels of liquidity, particularly if the
market is highly concentrated. As a result, combination of generation (including import
capacity) and supply activities discourage the merging company to participate on
wholesale markets (opting preferably for bilateral contracts between divisions of the
same merging firm). As it has been stated by the European Commission, low levels of
liquidity in wholesale markets might result in significant entry barriers.187
Having said that, and notwithstanding this important incorporation to the merger
analysis, the use of efficiencies as an ultimate ground to conclude that a given merger
should not be blocked in spite of certain anticompetitive effects, does not appear to have
gained relevant weight. The strict scrutiny applied by the European Commission and,
perhaps, the still excessive reliance on market shares factors, might be the cause of the
current lack of “interest” for the efficiency defense.
Finally, when anticompetitive effects arise from a merger, the European
Commission may still approve the transaction subject to certain commitments, offered
by the merging parties and ensured by means of conditions and obligations attached to
the competition authority’s decision.188 Those elements –referred to as remedies- aim at
186

David Newbery, What are the Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions arising from electricity market
structuring? (Florence School of Regulation 2007), deals with the advantages and concerns stemming
from the mergers in the electricity sector, pointing at, amongst others, the treatment of vertical mergers
between generation and supply, as well as mergers involving gas and electricity.
187
Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity
sectors, point 20 (Final Report) (European Commission 2007).
188
Articles 6.2 and 8.2 of EU merger regulation 139/2004.
In October 2005, the European Commission published the “Merger Remedies Study” containing an
assessment of the efficiency of merger remedies adopted in cleared mergers between 1996 and 2000. For
the sake of clarity in the application of remedies in the context of merger operations –and particularly in
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neutralizing the potential harmful impact in competition that a given merger might
involve. In this respect, even if in theory the European Commission is unable to impose
conditions and obligations189 -that will only be issued upon commitments expressed by
the merging parties-, in practice, the measures proposed by the companies will have to
comply with a set of guidelines published by the European Commission.
Indeed, akin to the evolution followed in the US in the application of the guiding
principles issued by the FTC/DOJ190, the European Commission has analyzed the long
term consequences derived from different kinds of remedies undertaken in previous
cases. Its assessment has thus focused on those conditions which most likely efficiently
address different angles of competition concerns frequently arising in the framework of
a merger operation. Accordingly, a company that considers entering into a merger
operation that is likely to raise competition concerns should have to take into close
consideration such guidance.
The election and analysis of remedies involve a high level of complexity both for
the merging firms and the European Commission. Indeed, both parties (but particularly
the companies) must carefully analyze those remedies that are able to neutralize
possible competitive concerns while not removing the business value of the transaction.
In this respect, even if commitments offered by the parties will be considered regardless
order to clarify the kind of commitments that are likely to accepted by this competition authority-, the
European Commission additionally published, in 2008, the Commission notice on remedies acceptable
under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004.
189
The Commission notice on remedies (points 19 and 20) clearly distinguishes between the two possible
outcomes of the commitments offered by the merging companies, should they are finally accepted by the
European Commission. Thus, a “condition” consists of a “requirement for achievement of the structural
change of the market” (for instance, the divestiture of a division of a company) and its infringement will
render the EC approval void; conversely, an “obligation” is defined as “the implementing steps” necessary
to achieve the final result expressed in the condition (the breach of an obligation might lead the European
Commission to “revoke clearance decisions issued”).
190
See “Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies”, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DOJ, at 4 (Oct.
2004) and “Statement of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger
Remedies”. Additionally, for a practical comparative analysis of the different feature of the US and EU
approach to remedies in the merger operations, see PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY'S CROSS-BORDER
COMPETITION HANDBOOK, and particularly the chapter devoted to “Merger Remedies Policy In The
EU and USA” (William Baer and Luc Gyselen).
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the Phase of the procedure in which they are made, it goes without a say that the
companies will try to avoid a time consuming in-depth phase II investigation that, in
many cases, might ruin the economic purpose of the transaction.191
When it comes to the key features depicted by the European Commission of what
a remedy should be in order to bring about the merger clearance, it stands out the
complete and effective eradication of all competition concerns, and the capability of
being hastily enforceable and susceptible to be monitored.192 Moreover, although every
case is supposed to be analyzed in a case-by-case basis according to its particular
characteristics, the European Commission puts forward two main types of remedies, i.e.
those based on structural measures and remedies based on conduct commitments.193
Structural initiatives –and particularly divestitures- appear to have gained the
favor of the European Commission. This trend bears a significant resemblance to the
approach applied by the FTC/DOJ in the review of remedies.194 It does not result
surprising, since it is broadly acknowledged that these measures require lower levels of

191

The need for a “good first try” on the commitments proposed by the entity also relies on the fact that,
as the European Commission has stated in its notice about remedies, the “commitments submitted to the
Commission in phase I must be sufficient to clearly rule out ‘serious doubts’ within the meaning of Article
6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation”. See Commission notice on remedies, point 18.
Conversely, should the operation passes to a second Phase review -due to the merger’s potential
significant impediment of effective competition-, the demand of the European Commission for tighter
remedies will increase. Indeed, commitments offered in this second stage “must be sufficient to eliminate
such a significant impediment to effective competition”.
In this respect, it is to be noted that, regardless the “quality” of the commitments proposed by the merging
companies, the European Commission keeps the burden of proof when it comes to the task of
demonstrating that the transaction, after consideration of the remedies proposed is still not compatible
with the common market. The merging companies, as far as they are concerned, remain responsible “to
provide all such information available that is necessary for the Commission's assessment of the remedies
proposal.” See Commission notice on remedies, point 7.
192
See Commission notice on remedies, section II.
193
For a further explanation on types of remedies and their suitability when it comes to the electric
industry, see DAMIEN GERADIN, REMEDIES IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EC COMPETITION
LAW VS. SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION (Intersentia, 2004).
194
However, slight differences exist between the FTC and DOJ when it comes to the implementation of
the conditions finally settled–mainly consisting of the preference of the FTC to tie up the details related to
the divestiture before the issuance of the final consent order-. For further information about the
application of remedies to mergers at both sides of the Atlantic, see the chapter devoted to Merger
Remedies Policy in the EU and USA (William Baer and Luc Gyselen) in PRACTICAL LAW
COMPANY'S CROSS-BORDER COMPETITION HANDBOOK (2006/07).
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supervision than the overview needed by behavioral commitments. Additionally,
structural measures generally address in a straightforward manner competition concerns
that arise from mergers.195 Thus, in cases such as the acquisition of Suez Group by Gaz
de France196, the European Commission, fearing substantial harms for competition in
the French gas markets as well as in the Belgian gas and electricity wholesale and retail
markets, conditioned the approval of the operation to a comprehensive package of
remedies. Most of these remedies were based on structural actions including, amongst
others, relinquishment of control over Belgian gas network operator; divestitures of the
shareholdings of Gaz de France in electricity markets in Belgium –SPE-, as well as the
sale of the main gas subsidiary of Suez –Distrigaz- in an effort to preserve competition
in a field highly dominated by the state-owned giant Gaz de France. 197
This type of commitments, however, suffers from some flaws. Indeed the
implementation of structural remedies by means of a divestiture presents numerous
intricacies -not always easy to resolve198- which might undermine the actual
effectiveness of the proposed measures. As it will be noted, the following weaknesses
may not automatically disqualify these commitments, but they should be borne in mind
by the competition authorities before taking a clearance decision based on those
conditions.

195

Commission notice on remedies, point 15. See also Richard J. Gilbert and David M. Newberry,
Electricity Merger Policy in the Shadow of Regulation (Energy Policy and Economics, October 2006),
where the authors remind that the “US experience of the workings of the Federal Power Act suggest that
regulation to inhibit market power is likely to involve continuous monitoring of deregulated electricity
markets”, finally concluding that “the Californian evidence might suggest that any behavioural remedy to
address the abuse of market power in deregulated electricity market would be more burdensome for the
undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.”
196
Case M.4180 - Gaz de France / Suez (2006)
197
It is noteworthy that a form of divestiture commonly used in energy mergers has consisted of the sale
of shareholding participations in energy related companies. Apart from the Gaz de France/ Suez case
already mentioned, see, amongst others, case M.1673 - VEBA / VIAG and case M.2947 - VERBUND /
Energie Allianz.
198
For a more detailed analysis of the potential shortcomings of a divestiture alternative to mergers, see
Penelope Papandropoulos and Alessandro Tajana, The Merger Remedies Study—In Divestiture We Trust?
(ECLR, 2006).
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First, the European Commission requires that the divestiture may create “the
conditions for the emergence of a new competitive entity or for the strengthening of
existing competitors via divestiture by the merging parties”.199 To that end, such an
entity must consist of a “viable business” being able to autonomously operate on a longterm basis. While the European Commission is clearly more sympathetic to divestures
of a business division “which was not previously legally incorporated as such”200,
carve-outs201 of divisions integrated in the structure of the business that is going to be
retained are also admitted if no other alternative is feasible.
In this respect, and particularly in the electricity sector, the viability of a business
division susceptible to be divested is often tied to an ancillary service that, at the same
time, might be essential for the development of the retained business. Indeed, for
instance, the trading division of an electric company might be as important for the
branch to be divested –e.g. electricity retailing activity- as it is for the retained business
–e.g. power generation, heavily dependent on trading activities-. Accordingly, the latter
might legitimately contend that the trading division, being an essential part of its
business, should be retained by the merging entity. Even if the European Commission
has tried to address potential disputes regarding the allocation of assets to the divested
business202, it frequently results complicated to determine the concrete assets that are
indispensable for the development of one or the another division. Hence, merging
companies will for the most part try to keep the best assets “onboard” (including key
employees), giving rise to controversies within the framework of the divesting

199

Commission notice on remedies, point 23.
Commission notice on remedies, point 33.
201
The European Commission defines a carve-out in its Merger Remedies Study (2005) as “the legal and
physical separation of the assets of the divested business from the parties’ retained business, so that the
divested business can operate on a stand-alone basis, which can compete successfully on a lasting basis
independently of the divesting parties.”
202
Commission notice on remedies, points 25 and 26.
200
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procedure or, if not detected by the competition authority, to a doomed to failure
divested division.
Second, but closely related to the previous factor, the suitability of a potential
purchaser of a divested business should be meticulously analyzed in order to avoid that
indirect effects of the very transaction –in the form of

divestitures- result in

anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.203 The typical oligopolistic panorama of
the electricity markets frequently makes difficult the task of selecting an appropriate
company that could face the challenge of incorporating the divested business resulting
from a merger without provoking more worrying competitive concerns than those that
the remedy purports to mitigate. Indeed, the risk of collusion must definitely remain a
source of concern whenever remedies are analyzed in the framework of a merger,
particularly in the electricity industry as a result of some of their specific features
briefed in previous sections (high degree of concentration, limited capacity, inelasticity
of demand, etc.). Accordingly, the European Commission, consistent with the final goal
set forth by the SIEC test, should primarily focus not just on the market shares held by
the parties after the remedy is applied, but on whether the merging entity -or the final
purchaser if a divestiture is accomplished- will enjoy more chances to exercise market
power, hence creating anticompetitive effects. As previously advanced, while
divestitures are generally considered by competition enforcers as a particularly well
suited tool –due to the absence of subsequent supervision-, under certain circumstances
other alternatives might better address the actual competition concerns that the
transaction could raise.

203

The European Commission sets, in point 48 of its Commission notice on remedies, the basic
requirements that a purchaser should meet, i.e. being unconnected to the merging firms, having the ability
(in both technical and financial terms) to run the business and not being likely to raise competition
concerns.
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Amongst these alternative measures, the introduction of behavioral remedies
appears to have been recognized204 as an effective mechanism, particularly if they are
combined with structural remedies when the transaction implies vertical or
conglomerate aspects. Thus, remedies based on conduct requirements have the
advantage of being flexible, easily adapting to different scenarios. Indeed their
enforcement may be extended or reduced depending on the evolution of the competition
in the market concerned. This flexibility turns out particularly relevant in the electricity
sector, as the European Commission has acknowledged on several occasions that the
analysis of a merger transaction will have to be developed “against the background of
the state of liberalisation of the electricity markets”.205 In this respect, the path to the
promised land of liberalization remains a dynamic process that, therefore, will benefit
from flexible mechanisms in the application of merger remedies.
Behavioral remedies such as the compromise of the companies to abstain from
certain conducts have already been considered in mergers connected to the electric
industry. In the case related to the creation of a joint venture company (EDFT) for the
trading of energy -and particularly electricity- between the French electricity incumbent
EDF and SA Louis Dreyfus & Cie206, the European Commission considered that the
competition concerns could be addressed by committing the parties not to engage through EDFT- in activities related to the sale of electricity to eligible customers in
France. 207

204

Commission notice on remedies, point 17.
Case M.1853 - EDF / ENBW (2001), point 13.
Thus, the European Commission decisions in cases such as EDF/ Louis Dreyfus (M.1557 -1999); Grupo
Villar Mir/ EnBW/ Hidroelectrica del Cantabrico (M.2434 - 2001); or the above mentioned EnBW/ EDP/
Cajastur / Hidrocantabrico, show the extent to which definition of the relevant product markets (and
particularly those related to supply activities) will vary according to the existing degree of liberalization.
206
Case M.1557 – EDF/Louis Dreyfus (1999).
207
To that end, there were created “Chinese walls” that would prevent the transfer of sensitive
information from EDFT to EDF when it comes to, amongst others, certain conditions incorporated to the
contracts with customers.
205
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In this decision the degree of market liberalization was also taken into
consideration when defining the appropriate remedy. Indeed, at that time the EU
Directive 96/92 on the creation of the electricity common market was not implemented
in France and, therefore, entries by newcomers to the electricity supply business were
not legally “compelled”. The foregoing flexibility of the behavioral measures was
clearly reflected in this decision, insofar as it was established that the commitments not
to share certain information would be linked to the implementation in France of the
Directive 96/92. Thus, the Chinese walls would be maintained as long as competition in
the electricity supply market was not effectively created. In this respect, mergers that
do not raise any competition concern in one liberalized country with its markets already
opened to effective competition could, on the contrary, be subject to stringent
conditions in a Member State in which the liberalization process has not reached an
advanced stage.208
To a certain extent, the European Commission has in practice recognized this
virtue, increasingly209 bringing into play behavioral remedies where vertical concerns
were at stake. In its Merger Remedies Study, the European Commission recognizes that
the possibility to modify or rescind the commitment over the time “meant that such
commitments – if shown to be excessive or no longer necessary because of market
circumstances – could be altered with fairly minimal disruption to the parties or the
marketplace. In fact, interviewed parties consistently pointed out the need for review
clauses in commitments involving the grant of access.”210 Some of the alleged

208

Even in one and the same Member State, measures that are needed today in order to foster competition
could be no longer required after several years.
209
According to the European Commission’s “Merger Remedies Study” (2005), “vertical concerns were
mainly addressed by commitments to grant access (83%).17 Access remedies were also accepted to
resolve competition concerns in cases involving a combination of horizontal and vertical concerns.”
See also DAMIEN GERADIN, REMEDIES IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EC COMPETITION LAW
VS. SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 56 (Intersentia, 2004).
210
Merger Remedies Study (2005), page 116.
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shortcomings of the behavioral commitments (e.g. the requirement of granting open
access to a company’s key assets reduces the incentive of incumbents for investing in
certain infrastructures, R&D, etc.)211, could even be addressed by means of an
appropriate enforcement of the remedy (a given behavioral condition could be softened
over the time and so the disincentive to invest).
A hybrid212 solution between structural and behavioral remedy was undertaken by
the European Commission when it authorized the acquisition of EnBW (a German
market player in the field of electricity supply activities in the Southwest of Germany,
close to the French border) by EDF.213 The clearance was subject to, amongst other
conditions, a capacity release commitment aimed at eliminating the competition
concerns detected.214 The capacity release consisted of the obligation for EDF to give
access to its electricity generation capacity in France to other competitors, principally
by means of Virtual Power Plants for an initial period of five years (up to 5,000 MW
comprising 4,000 MW of baseload and 1,000 MW of peakload capacity).215 Here again,

211

Behavioral remedies might consist of the “granting of access to key infrastructure, networks, key
technology, including patents, know-how or other intellectual property rights, and essential inputs”,
Commission notice on remedies, point 62. These remedies seek, for the most part, market entries by new
competitors.
The removal of existing exclusive agreements may also be viewed as another way of mitigating potential
anticompetitive effects stemming from the transaction. As pointed out by the European Commission in its
notice on remedies, in Case COMP/M.2822 — ENI/EnBW/GVS (2002), it was granted an “early
termination rights to all local gas distributors concerning long-term gas supply agreements”.
212
Beyond the depiction of the different kind of remedies set in the European Commission’s notice on
remedies, it is not always clear what the nature of a measure is, behavioral or structural. In the case
M.2684 - EnBW / EDP / Cajastur / Hidrocantabrico, the European Commission met the concerns related
to the potential increase of isolation of the Spanish wholesale electricity markets (already highly
concentrated), by accepting the undertakings offered by EDF (which jointly controlled EnBW) and EDFRTE (operator of the French electricity grid) to take “all the necessary steps in order to increase the
commercial capacity on the interconnector which transmits electricity across the Pyrenean chain to about
4,000 MW from an existing 1,100 MW. The capacity increase will take place gradually over a short-/midterm period.”As it is asserted later in this section, the difference between these types of remedies might
result irrelevant inasmuch as they are capable of removing the competition concerns detected in the
transaction.
213
Case M.1853 - EDF / ENBW (2001)
214
The transaction, as proposed by the parties, would have led to the strengthening of EDF's dominant
position on the market for supply of electricity to large customers in France. Indeed, the merger as
originally filed would have removed one of the most likely potential competitors with ability to enter the
French retail market.
215
The use of VPPs as a way of mitigating the exercise of market power by incumbents has been broadly
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the flexibility of this mechanism avoid permanent divestments, permitting the European
Commission to adapt the length of the measure to the pace in the opening of markets to
competition (the initial 5 year-period for the VPPs to run, was subsequently extended,
subject to minor amendments, for a further term of 4 years).
However in practice, most of the behavioral measures are accompanied of
structural remedies.216 Thus, regardless of the nature of the remedy finally chosen
within the framework of a given merger operation, it will remain essential to ensure that
the commitment addresses the anticompetitive effects previously detected by the
European Commission. And in this endeavor, a mix of behavioral and structural
measures might be the most effective approach.
A more controversial question revolves around the fact of whether the European
Commission, when analyzing the appropriate remedies to a proposed merger, should
explicitly invoke other than competition-related arguments, such as EU energy policy
objectives. Having reviewed throughout this section the different consequences that one
or another approach to merger control in the electricity field might bring to the
integration and liberalization goals, the following section further examines the rights
and wrongs of the incorporation of those others considerations in the European
Commission analysis.

extended also amongst the national competition and regulatory authorities (including, besides the French
case, VPPs taken place in Denmark, Germany, Belgium and Spain amongst others). However, criticisms
have been raised when it comes to the success of this method on the actual promotion of market entries,
etc. Factors such as the definition of strike prices and reserve prices have led to legal battles in Spain
between incumbents, bidders and the Ministry of Industry that, eventually, might lead to the removal of
this mechanism.
216
Thus, the VPP “solution” used in the EDF/ EnBW case was complemented with a series of additional
measures such as the divestiture by EnBW of its shareholding in the company WATT. Other cases
combining behavioral and structural remedies are, for instance, the proposed acquisition of exclusive
control of Segebel (company with a 51% stake in SPE, the second largest electricity operator in Belgium)
by EDF. In this case the condition consisted of an immediate divestiture combined with an obligation to
invest in electricity generation facilities. M.5549 - EDF / Segebel (2009).
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5. EU Merger Control in the light of the “Third Energy Package”: exploring
further involvement in the liberalization process.
So far this paper has reviewed some of the aspects that should be taken into
consideration when analyzing transactions in the electricity sector. Indeed, assuming
that the role to be played by the EU merger control is increasingly relevant for
achieving the integration and liberalization goals (and particularly to address some
structural flaws frequently suffered by the electricity markets), previous sections have
gauged the ability of different merger control approaches to identify some of the
relevant factors that might affect the development of competitive markets. The array of
issues ranges from merely jurisdictional questions -such as the application of the Two
Thirds Rule- that however might endanger a comprehensive control by the European
Commission over all mergers having potential cross-border effects, to the substantive
analysis applied when analyzing electricity-related mergers. As it has been constantly
reminded, all those elements, if not conveniently assessed, may have consequences for
the achievement of the integration and liberalization of the electricity markets.
Against this background, the question of including non-competition concerns
(such as energy policy objectives, not necessarily directly related to the transaction
being analyzed by the competition agency) arises as the regulatory measures in the
electricity sector have not always proven to be as effective as expected.217 Thus, a major
boost for the liberalization process might be given by means of the merger control. By
contrast, some incumbents, but also various Member States, have also claimed that “too
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This question has been also subject to discussion within the context of the EU antitrust enforcement,
particularly when it comes to the use of the remedies provided by article 7 of the Regulation 1/2003
(related to the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
[2003] OJ L1/1) in order to achieve, for instance, ownership unbundling not reached by means of
regulatory provisions. See Hubertus Von Rosenberg, Unbundling through the back door...the case of
network divestiture as a remedy in the energy sector, 30(5) 237-254 (E.C.L.R. 2009).
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strict” merger control could hinder the establishment of strong European actors which
are required to match the power of external suppliers.
In fact, explicitly or implicitly, EU policies related to the security of supply,
liberalization and integration of the markets or purely environmental aspects –some of
them clearly developed by the third energy package- are at stake when analyzing merger
operations in the electricity sector. In this context, it is noteworthy that procedures lay
down in different EU Member States as well as at the US federal and state level
jurisdictions have included, one way or another, some factors alien to pure competitive
considerations in their merger control analysis. Before addressing the appropriateness of
including considerations related to these matters in the European Commission’s merger
control procedure, this paper will briefly analyze those concerns and how other
jurisdictions have dealt with them.
a.

EU merger control v. other competition-related considerations
First, halfway between purely competition concerns and EU energy policy goals,

the liberalization of the electricity markets is a variable that the Directorate General for
Competition of the European Commission has already taken into consideration when
reviewing mergers in the electricity sector.218 Initially, this factor was used to better
appraise the consequences that a merger operation could entail in a more or less
concentrated environment. Likewise, this variable was applied to define a relevant
market according to the “relevant state of liberalization”.219 In that sense, the
significance of the existing level of liberalization was limited to its instrumentality as a
tool serving to better gauge the effects of a transaction in a, for instance, already
concentrated market.

218
219

Case M.1557 EDF/ Louis Dreyfus (1999)
Case M.1853 - EDF / ENBW Point 13 (2001).
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The employ of the liberalization as a goal that should be expressly pursued by
means of the merger control has been an issue much more blurred though. As a result of
the findings of the European Commission sector inquiry220, different representatives221
of this Institution, and the Institution itself through different reports published in the last
years222, have pointed at merger control as one of the potential drivers to remedy some
of the woes that slow down the consecution of the liberalization process (amongst
others, high levels of market concentration, but also little cross-border integration or
vertical integration). However, beyond these institutional statements, the European
Commission has not clearly introduced this factor in its Merger Control decisionmaking procedure.223
In this respect, different authors224 have discussed about the convenience of
continuing applying a so-called “principle of neutrality” in the merger control
enforcement –that in theory would imply the European Commission “confinement” in
competition-related arguments when analyzing concentrations in the electricity sector.
While this issue is further considered later in this section, this paper finds reasonable
that merger control became an important device to contribute to the EU integration and
liberalization process; in this sense, the inflexible and orthodox vision on the
enforcement of merger control relying uniquely on competition grounds might need to
220

Communication from the Commission: Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) (2007).
221
Philippe Lowe, former Director General of the Directorate General for Competition of the European
Commission, The Liberalisation of EU Energy Markets, The Royal Society, London (9 November 2006).
222
Communication from the Commission: Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
into the European gas and electricity sectors Point41 (Final Report).
223
While the liberalization process in the electricity and gas markets have been extensively analyzed in
the Case M.3440 - ENI / EDP / GDP (2004), others factors drove the final decision of the European
Commission.
224
See François Levêque, Antitrust Enforcement in the Electricity and Gas Industries: Problems and
Solutions for the EU (CERNA, June 2006); and Francesco María Salerno, Current Issues of EU merger
control in the energy sector: a proposed framework to foster the dialogue (ECLR, 2007).
In a similar approach to this issue, the letter sent to the European Commission by OFGEM (see note 105)
within the context of the Ruhrgas’ acquisition by German utility E.ON, the British regulator requested a
clear interaction between regulatory and merger control measures, proposing, amongst others, that
“competition authorities could where appropriate permit mergers only where unbundling is promoted”.
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be reconsidered because, amongst other reasons, legal arguments for the incorporation
of other variables do exist. Additionally, should the measures on unbundling contained
in the third energy package do not come into fruition, the EU merger control might
contribute to offset regulatory pitfalls by, for instance, addressing transactions that
imply further vertical integration between generation and transmission activities.
In the US, it is not uncommon that an authority responsible for the clearance of a
merger operation conditions its approval to the fulfillment of some additional
requirements, not necessarily related (at least in a straightforward way) to usual
competition factors. Indeed, FERC usually required utilities implied in a merger, prior
to granting its approval, to join an Independent System Operator or Regional
Transmission Organization.225
Second, the electricity prices (both at wholesale and retail level) resulting from a
merger transaction also become a source of concern for the European Commission –as
well as for any other competition authority responsible for merger control enforcement-,
and, above all, for the European consumers. European Commission’s findings in this
field have revolved around two main areas, namely, the external aspects that might
cause price increases –particularly fuels costs and CO2 emission trading scheme- and
regulated subsidized tariffs to resident and energy intensive customers.226
The analysis of the real effects on prices stemming from merger operations goes
beyond the scope of this paper; however, it should be pointed out that, while an
appropriate control of merger operations can maintain and develop effective
competition that, eventually, might result in more competitive electricity prices on
wholesale and retail markets, consumers in many countries of the EU (as it has also
225

Those conditions are mainly linked to FERC’s efforts of boosting the deregulation process in the
electric industry.
226
DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry (SEC(2006)1724, 10 January 2007), Part II.
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been the case in some areas of US)227 have for a long time benefited from access to
electricity at regulated subsidized tariffs. This factor has deprived the final consumers
from receiving price signals that, as a result, apart from the fact of limiting the
alternatives to discipline the wholesale market prices, has created a false perception of
what electricity prices should be. Accordingly, this has created a misconception of what
the results of the liberalization might be in terms of electricity prices.
As in some other jurisdictions where liberalization processes have taken place, in
some areas of the US rises of electricity prices that occasionally followed the
deregulation process have prompted complaints in the consumer side, and a sense of
uneasiness in the political front. As a result, different mechanisms have been
implemented to protect consumers (particularly, but not exclusively, residential
customers) from price volatility. The suitability of these policies being a matter of
opinion, it is apparent that at least some of those mechanisms have proven to entail
different shortcomings in the long run.228 Accordingly, the introduction of
considerations (and potential conditions) related to prices in the merger analysis tend to
be more sensitive in the framework of industries in the process of liberalization and
should be carefully approached.
b.

EU merger control v. energy related considerations
The security of supply is one of the variables that, being more closely linked to

pure energy concerns, arises when a merger operation is proposed in the energy market.
Its significance is not a secret neither for consumers and energy incumbents nor for
227

Countries like Portugal, France, Italy, Spain, Hungary or Poland have maintained for longtime
regulated supply tariffs, many times situated below wholesale market prices (provoking clear disrupts in
competition when, for instance, the supply at those privileged rates is restrained to a certain type of
companies).
228
Depending on the configuration of the price ceilings, this mechanism might prevent demand from
disciplining wholesale prices. Moreover, apart from not favoring conservation and efficiency-related
initiatives launched by the European Commission, price caps could also affect competition between
suppliers if some of the electricity providers are banned from supplying electricity at those advantageous
rates (particularly if such rates are offered at prices well below marginal costs).
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public Institutions (both at national and EU level).
On the electricity front, the EU suffered in November 2006 a serious blackout that
left more than 15 million European households without power supply and triggered the
alarms related to the reliability of the European electricity markets. A subsequent
report229 issued at the request of the European Commission pointed mainly at the lack of
security procedures of the TSO origin of the fault (i.e. E.ON Netz), absence of adequate
coordination with other TSOs and the insufficient investment both at the reliability level
and operation of the grid. In the US, the security of electricity supply also came under
the spotlight as a result of the California energy crisis at the beginning of the 2000s,
which origin might be found in the lack of investment in new generation and
transmission capacity and a probably inadequately designed regulatory framework.230
The importance given to this matter has been reflected in the European Union by
the approval in 2005 of a European directive specifically devoted to security of
electricity supply and infrastructure investment.231 This Directive aims at establishing
measures that preserve “security of electricity supply so as to ensure the proper
functioning of the EU internal market for electricity, an adequate level of
interconnection between member states, an adequate level of generation capacity and
balance between supply and demand.”232 When doing so, the directive requires the
Member States to focus on questions like diversity in the electricity generation mix,
development of cross-border cooperation and regularly maintenance of transmissions

229

“Final Report System Disturbance on 4 November 2006” published by the Union for the co-ordination
of transmission of electricity. Report available on December 19, 2009 at:
http://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/publications/ce/otherreports/Final-Report20070130.pdf
230
Many valuable dissertations have been written about this issue. For instance see, D. Bush, In
(Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame For California's Power Woes, or Why
Antitrust Law Fails To Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use (Oregon
Law Review, Vol. 83, p. 204, 2004).
231
Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 concerning
measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment.
232
Id.
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and distribution networks. Likewise, security of supply has also been at the center of the
third energy package, standing out as one of the main objectives of the directive
2009/72. As already discussed, this directive included a provision related to the
acquisition of Transmission System Operators (TSOs) by operators from a third country
company, foreseeing the possibility that the national regulatory authorities233, upon
approval from the European Commission, refuse the certification required for a TSO to
operate, should the controlling company “put at risk the security of energy supply of the
Member State and the Community”.234 In that sense, in order to evaluate the jeopardy of
the security of supply, practically any circumstances of the case as well as of the third
country concerned can be analyzed.
Notwithstanding this, the security of supply has not become a conclusive factor
neither to determine the clearance or challenge of a merger operation, nor to settle on
potential remedies to a transaction at the EU level. However, what the EU merger
control Regulation 139/2004 do foresee in its article 21.4 is the possibility that the
Member States “take appropriate measures” to protect interests that have not been
considered by the European Commission when analyzing the operation:
“member states may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests
other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation [139/2004] and compatible
with the general principles and other provisions of Community law. Public security,
plurality of the media and prudential rules shall be regarded as legitimate interests
within the meaning of the first subparagraph. Any other public interest must be
communicated to the Commission by the Member State concerned and shall be
recognised by the Commission after an assessment of its compatibility with the general
principles and other provisions of Community law before the measures referred to
above may be taken. The Commission shall inform the Member State concerned of its
decision within 25 working days of that communication”.235 (Emphasis added).
233

Independent bodies that, pursuant to recital 36 of the Directive 2009/79 “should be able to fix or
approve tariffs, or the methodologies underlying the calculation of the tariffs, on the basis of a proposal
by the transmission system operator or distribution system operator( s), or on the basis of a proposal
agreed between those operator(s) and the users of the network. In carrying out those tasks, national
regulatory authorities should ensure that transmission and distribution tariffs are non-discriminatory and
cost-reflective, and should take account of the long-term, marginal, avoided network costs from
distributed generation and demand-side management measures.”
234
Id. at art.11
235
Regulation 139/2004, art. 21.4.
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In spite of the at first view “alarming” blurring of the one-stop-shop principle
supported at the EU level, this provision does not, in general terms, frustrate the
applicable exclusive jurisdiction of the European Commission over concentrations with
Community dimension. Indeed, the attribution included in this provision does not
enable a Member State to approve a transaction prohibited by the European
Commission, but just to bar, subject to stringent requirements, a merger cleared by the
European Commission.236
Member states have in turn reacted to the security of supply concern by trying to
foster national energy champions by means of mergers being reviewed at a national
level (in certain occasions as a result of the Two Thirds Rule). As briefly exposed in
previous sections, this tendency has been counteracted (or at least mitigated) by the
European Commission in so far as it frequently implies infringements of competition
rules, sector-specific regulations (or both). But apart from the breach of the EU
legislation that those conducts might entail, the effectiveness itself of those national
champions over the goals that their corresponding governments purport to achieve is, at
least, doubtful. In fact, individual initiatives tending to create national champions have
probably few chances to unilaterally resolve the security of supply concerns that a
country might face.
Finally, the main market operators have also had a say in this discussion about
security of supply. While a proper liberalization of the electricity and gas markets
appears to have gained acceptance as a way to create efficiency gains237, some concerns
remain unsettled. It has been frequently argued by some incumbents that a strict
application of the merger control could hinder EU’s objective related to the security of
236

EDURNE NAVARRO ET AL., MERGER CONTROL IN THE EU 412 (Oxford ed., 2d ed. 2005).
See for instance outcomes of the second Transatlantic Energy Security Dialogue on “Security of
Supply in Liberalized Energy Markets Transatlantic Experiences and Future Challenges” organized by
The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) (Berlin, 25 May 2007).
237
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supply since only large utilities can afford the investments required in order to maintain
and develop the required level of networks and cross-border interconnections; in some
cases it has been even feared that “private energy markets may not be able to effectively
address a range of issues related to security of supply”.238
Lessons learned from the above mentioned energy crisis have however showed
that the security of supply, commonly defined as reliable energy provided at reasonable
cost, greatly depends at the EU level, at least on the electricity front, on variables like

cross-border interconnection (being also this factor a requirement to achieve full market
integration), diversification of the portfolio of technologies used to generate that
electricity239, appropriate congestion management and sound electricity markets.
Closely related to these elements it also outstands the separation of network operation
and grid development from generation and supply activities.240 For similar reasons, the
vertical integration in electricity markets, while being susceptible of providing energy
efficiencies, might have negative effects on the security of supply given the shortage of
liquidity that vertical integration can involve.
Thus, while loosening up merger control standards does not appear to be an
effective answer to address concerns in this field, it is clear that security of supply (and
particularly related elements such as fostering of interconnection) can be affected by
major mergers. The question that arises is to what extent EU merger control
enforcement should grasp strategic advantages of cross border mergers and include this
consideration into its analysis. Some progress in this sense has been already detected
when the European Commission has made its approval of a merger conditional to the
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Id.
SECURITY OF SUPPLY IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS: EVIDENCE AND POLICY ISSUES
(OECD, 2002).
240
Indeed, incumbents, under certain circumstances, might not be motivated to invest in transmission
should the resulting enhanced capacity brings more competition to the markets where they deploy their
activities.
239
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development of interconnection facilities between two Member States.241 However, for
the time being, these decisions are probably more linked to competition goals rather
than objectives connected to the security of supply.
Ultimately, environmental aspects like the consecution of cleaner energy sources
set in the third energy package can also be seen by some observers as a variable to be
taken into consideration in merger operations (e.g. environmental objectives might be
reached by favoring, for instance, remedies tending to require to the electricity
companies the development of less polluting power plants; in that sense, reduction of
emissions might be also taken into consideration when analyzing possible remedies).
In conclusion, it is clear that the amount of issues that can be taken into
consideration in the framework of merger transactions is broad. However, drawing the
line between the reasonable elements that a competition authority could incorporate to
its analysis and the excessive discretionary power that would be granted to the European
Commission as a result of the inclusion of multiple items of evidence upon which take a
merger decision (that, at the end, might endanger the legal certainty and necessary
predictability when proposing merger operations) is not obvious. Concepts like public
security may help to resolve this dilemma. The elaboration of mandatory but not
binding reports on these non-competition aspects by other divisions within the European
Commission (but not the Directorate General for Competition itself) could also be part
of a solution, avoiding the adulteration of the competition analysis carried out by that
DG Competition (at the same time that accommodates some of the concerns expressed
by different Member States, but from a communitarian perspective).
c.

A well-balanced merger control enforcement

241

See the commitments undertaken by EDF/RTE related to the measures necessary to increase the
commercial interconnection capacity between France and Spain. Case M.2434 - Grupo Villar Mir /
ENBW / Hidroelectrica del Cantabrico (2001).
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The debate about the convenience of having the European Commission addressing
non-competition goals in its decisions over merger operations should take into
consideration the current existence of provisions in the EU Merger Regulation that
already incorporates into the analysis elements alien to competition. In fact, the article
21.4 of Regulation 139/2004 mentioned before is clear evidence that, under certain
circumstances, there is room for considerations not directly linked to competition law
analysis. Thus, EU energy principles like the security of supply could be given a room
in the merger analysis undertaken by the European Commission without being at odds
with the philosophy of the EU merger enforcement. Progress on the development of
transmission and cross-border infrastructure, higher levels of cooperation between
TSOs or diversification of the mix of generation could become objectives to be
expressly pursued by the remedies insomuch as they contribute to ensure the
maintenance of electricity supply at reasonable prices.
The incorporation of this dimension to the analysis of mergers applied by the
European Commission would be particularly favorable in so far as it could in a way
replace (or render unnecessary) measures to guarantee security of supply undertaken
unilaterally by Member States. In fact, the concern about ensuring electricity supply
would remain intact, but its application could pass, at least when it comes to the merger
operations with cross-border effects, to a centralized body that can reasonably have a
broader view, more consistent and effective in the long term.
Furthermore, finding legal systems that expressly accommodate possible security
of supply objectives to the final decisions to be undertaken within the framework of a
merger is not unusual. For instance, the UK legislation242 on merger control grants the
national competition authorities the prerogative of challenging an operation that might
242

UK Enterprise Act (2002), chapter 2.
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endanger “interests of national security”. When it comes to the US, the objective of
FERC when analyzing a merger consists of ensuring that the transaction is consistent
with the public interest (that, as explained in previous sections, include –at least in
theory- the analysis of the merger’s effect on competition, on rates and on
regulation).243 In practice, however, the consideration of some factors foreign to
competition objectives appears to be much more atypical.244
Additionally, as some observers have pointed out245, the EU Merger Regulation
does not only pursues the maintenance of effective competition in the common market,
but also its development, showing a clear vocation towards variables that contribute to
achieve that level of effective competition. Therefore, that factor would further allow
reviewing mergers under the liberalization prism, given the alleged consequences for
competition that such process of liberalization could bring in the long run.
Finally, the proposed intertwining of non-competition goals within the merger
control enforcement should not be deemed inconsistent with the criticism occasionally
made to some Member States as a result of their consideration of other than
competition-related matters. In fact, the significance of principles like the security of
supply is rarely disputed; on the contrary, the reproach to some Member States
frequently stems from the biased, and in some occasions dogmatic, application of that
principle in order to favor national companies, usually missing the actual challenging
points that the transaction may generate.
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See the proposed merger between American Electric Power Company and Central and Southwest
Corporation (2000), subject to the FERC supervision.
244
For instance, when it comes to the potential incorporation of the effect of a merger on the environment
as a factor in deciding about the approval of the transaction, FERC has “recognized that a particular
merger can have environmental effects”; however they “do not see the need to change our regulation,
which explicitly addresses the possibility that an EA or EIS may, on rare occasions, be needed”. Merger
policy statement, 1996.
245
See François Levêque, Antitrust Enforcement in the Electricity and Gas Industries: Problems and
Solutions for the EU, (CERNA, June 2006).
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6. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the factors that the EU and US merger control
enforcement consider in the process of reviewing transactions in the electricity sector.
Particularly, the challenges and potential consequences for the integration and
liberalization processes that may stem from one or another manner of implementing the
merger control have been highlighted. On the EU front, the paper analyzed procedures
that might put in jeopardy the European Commission’s effective supervision over all
mergers having potential cross-border effects.
Specifically regarding the application of the Two Thirds Rule, this paper included
a plea for the European Commission jurisdiction over mergers in the electricity sector if
the effects of a transaction spill over the boundaries of one EU Member State.
Compromise solutions that would not offensively invade the field of competence of
national competition authorities could be undertaken, limiting the additional power
granted to the European Commission.
As for the substantive analysis applied when analyzing electricity-related mergers,
it has been noted that the analysis of the mergers should not end with the calculation of
the market concentration, being necessary to give, on the contrary, more credit to the
examination of the real competition effects derived from the transaction. In this respect,
the approach undertaken by DOJ, and in general terms the analysis that the European
Commission has followed when analyzing mergers in the electricity field, has proven to
be more successful detecting competition concerns than the speedy analytical screen
applied by FERC. Vertical and conglomerate mergers in electricity markets have also
drawn particular attention and require the appropriate care of the European
Commission.
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This “mantra” should be followed as well when analyzing potential remedies,
focusing on measures that tend to eliminate the competition concerns. Behavioral
remedies could help (and in practice do help) to reach that goal in the electricity sector
(depending on the circumstances, in combination with structural remedies or not).
Therefore, the European Commission’s notice on remedies might go wrong when
underestimating the value of those measures.
As a result, while the approach and the test applied to analyze mergers in the
electricity sector does not need to be structurally different to the one undertaken when
reviewing concentrations in other industries, their interpretation must be flexible enough
to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of the electric markets.
Finally, when it comes to the incorporation of EU policies related to the security
of supply, liberalization and integration of the markets or purely environmental aspects
to the analysis of a merger undertaken by the European Commission, the paper has
noted the possibility for that inclusion insomuch as it falls under principles related to
public security or merely if they favor the development of competition within the
common market.
In sum, this paper supports that merger control, side by side with the new regulatory
framework approved in the electricity sector, could become the suitable “missing link”
required in order to avoid additional future energy packages. Particularly, should the

measures contained in the recently approved energy legislation not come into fruition,
the EU merger control might contribute to offset those regulatory pitfalls.
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